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ELIZABETH Y. MCCUSKEY*
At this moment, there exists nearly unanimous agreement that the 
American health care system requires reform, but also vehement 
disagreements over what form regulation should take and who should 
be in charge of regulating—state or federal authorities. Preemption 
doctrine typically referees disputes between federal and state 
regulatory efforts, but it also exacerbates them. There exists nearly as 
unanimous opinion that preemption doctrine in health law is a mess. 
This Article identifies an inventive structure that may help defuse some 
preemption problems in health reform. 
The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) individual and employer mandates, 
health insurance exchanges, and insurance coverage standards 
established preemptive federal baselines for health insurance
regulation. Yet the ACA also quietly permits states to apply for a waiver 
of all these baseline provisions, if they promise to enact state legislation 
with equivalent protections. Through this waiver provision—the 
“section 1332” or “state innovation” wavier—the federal agencies 
may sanction state variations if the agencies find suitable evidence that 
the variations will further the goals of the federal baselines.
The ACA’s combination of express preemption and guided waiver 
raises a novel confluence of “big waiver” theory and preemption 
doctrine. This Article posits that this confluence offers an “agency 
imprimatur” model that has great potential for managing health law 
federalism issues by circumventing conflict. At its best, the agency 
imprimatur model offers advantages over preemption in expertise, 
transparency, and communicative federalism. These potential 
advantages, however, hinge on the presence of meaningful waiver 
standards that preserve the statutory priorities and require reliance on 
agencies’ substantive expertise. The section 1332 wavier is not without 
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its pitfalls, but the recently proposed mega waivers would erode all of 
these potential gains.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal and state regulatory powers overlap enormously when it comes to 
regulating health. States have long relied on their general police powers to 
regulate for the sake of their citizens’ health, safety, and welfare.1 Meanwhile, 
Congress has generated an expanding federal police power presence in health 
law by exercising its enumerated powers and delegating their execution to 
federal agencies.2 State and federal regulatory authorities have exercised their 
respective powers concurrently, but with little coordination.3 This concurrence 
and cacophony has produced frequent tensions between state and federal 
regulation, contributing to a fragmented health care system and, at times, an 
incoherent preemption doctrine.4
Preemption referees the frequent tensions between state and federal laws, 
giving duly enacted federal law preemptive power over conflicting state law.5
Preemption doctrine has tried to answer the difficult questions of whether and 
to what extent federal and state laws conflict, relying on statutory text and 
                                                                                                                     
1 Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Body of Preemption: Health Law Traditions and the 
Presumption Against Preemption, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 95, 99 (2016).
2 See ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY,
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 4, 109–12 (2007); McCuskey, supra note 1, at 100.
3 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 123 fig.1. 
4 See FIELD, supra note 2, at 168–69 (“The conflict between federal and state authority 
permeates American political history.”); Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 454–63 (2011) (tracing the evolution of federalism in health care cases 
and lamenting the lack of coherence). See generally EINER ELHAUGE, THE FRAGMENTATION 
OF U.S. HEALTH CARE (2010) (explaining overarching aspects of the U.S. health care system, 
the causes of its fragmentation, and possible approaches to health care reform); George B. 
Moseley III, The U.S. Health Care Non-System, 1908–2008, 10 AMA J. ETHICS 324, 324–
28 (2008) (analyzing how U.S. systems for health care delivery and reimbursement 
developed from a largely unregulated, free-market-type state in the early 1900s to a highly 
regulated state in modern times). 
5 See, e.g., Preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368–69 (10th ed. 2014) (“The 
principle (derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can supersede or supplant 
any inconsistent state law or regulation.”); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 
225 n.3 (2000) (using “preemption” to “refer to the displacement of state law by federal 
statutes (or by courts seeking to fill gaps in federal statutes)”); James G. Hodge Jr. & Alicia 
Corbett, Legal Preemption and the Prevention of Chronic Conditions, 13 PREVENTING 
CHRONIC DISEASE, June 30, 2016, at 1, 1–2, https://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2016/pdf/16_
0121.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMF3-H4S6] (offering a “Brief Primer on Legal Preemption”).
See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 
782 (1994) (suggesting that the Necessary and Proper Clause offers the preemptive power);
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008) 
(engaging with Gardbaum’s theory but ultimately returning to the Supremacy Clause as the 
root of preemption). 
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divination of congressional intent as its ultimate touchstone.6 The Supreme 
Court’s preemption doctrine itself has become increasingly complex, prompting 
criticism of its fidelity to the Constitution and its refusal to acknowledge the 
discretionary nature of its central inquiries.7
While federal, state, and local regulators jostle with each other on 
concurrently regulated health care topics, courts have applied preemption 
doctrine in ways that have frustrated local, state, and federal regulators and 
further fragmented the health care system.8 All this concurrent authority and 
contested refereeing resulted in a health law landscape overcrowded with 
regulation in some areas, and barren in others.9
Against the backdrop of piecemeal health regulation and haphazard
preemption, the Affordable Care Act (ACA)10 broke new ground by enacting 
federal reforms across numerous health law issues, all aimed at system-wide 
goals of expanding access to care and controlling its costs.11 The seminal 
provisions in the ACA all addressed health insurance.12 The individual mandate, 
employer mandate, health insurance exchanges, and insurance coverage 
regulations reformed the commercial insurance market, which has been 
traditionally regulated by state law.13 The ACA eschewed preemption in some 
areas and embraced it in others, expressing Congress’s intent that its federal 
insurance market reforms preempt conflicting state laws.14
Yet with the same pen, Congress created a waiver provision which 
delegated to the implementing agency, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), the authority to waive the major pillars of the ACA’s insurance
market reforms for states to pursue their own variations.15 The section 
                                                                                                                     
6 E.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (“The purpose 
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone” of preemption (citations omitted)); accord Cipollone 
v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
7 See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 808; Nelson, supra note 5, at 260–62; 
Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION CHOICE
119, 119–43 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009); Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 230 (2011). 
8 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 120–29.
9 See FIELD, supra note 2, at 142–43; cf. Huberfeld, supra note 4, at 454–60 (tracing 
the evolution of federalism in health care cases and lamenting the lack of coherence).
10 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20, 21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 36, 42
U.S.C.); OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, 111TH CONG., COMPILATION OF PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2010).
11 See Amy Goldstein, Priority One: Expanding Coverage, in LANDMARK 73, 73
(2010).
12 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12 to -17 (2012); INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L
ACADEMIES, THE IMPACTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON PREPAREDNESS RESOURCES 
AND PROGRAMS 135–46 (2014). 
13 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 139.
14 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2012).
15 See id. § 18052(a)–(c).
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1332 waiver program, which took effect January 1, 2017, applies to the ACA’s 
core provisions: the individual mandate, employer mandate, health insurance 
exchange requirements, and some coverage regulations.16 This big waiver gives 
the agency the power to sanction certain state variations on the ACA’s reforms 
and waive the otherwise preemptive requirements, as long as the state can 
plausibly predict its experiment will be equivalent to the ACA in affordability, 
comprehensive coverage, and number of people insured.17 This represents a 
departure from the more familiar Medicaid waiver model, which merely permits 
modification of the terms on which a state receives funding from an optional 
Spending Clause program.18 This is a waiver of mandatory and preemptive law. 
It is a giant, even among “big” waivers.
Preemption and the waiver of it strike at the heart of regulatory federalism. 
Scholars have recently begun to supply some much-needed theory for waiver 
delegations, focusing on their constitutionality, desirability, and federalism 
angles.19 “Big waiver,” as Professors Barron and Rakoff termed it in 2013, is 
now a big deal.20 Yet statutory waiver’s growing ubiquity remains 
“underappreciated” and its theory remains inchoate.21 Preemption, by contrast, 
has already spawned a tremendous volume of theoretical scholarship, as well as 
some empirical analysis, on its accessibility, foundations, and impact on the core 
structure of federalism.22 In the past decade, courts and scholars have engaged 
in vigorous debate over agencies’ power to preempt and the deference courts 
                                                                                                                     
16 Id.; see also Heather Howard & Galen Benshoof, Health Affairs Blog Post, 1332 
Waivers and the Future of State Health Reform, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 237, 
237 (2015).
17 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b).
18 See Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and 
Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 29 
(2013); Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and into the Light: Using Section 1115 
Medicaid Waivers To Implement the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 213, 214 (2015).
19 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 265, 278 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck et al., Essay, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox 
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1818 (2015); Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined 
Devolution and the New Education Federalism, 103 CAL. L. REV. 565, 567–68 (2015); 
Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119, 1137–43
(2015); see also David Russell, Administrative Balance 2–10 (July 6, 2016) (unpublished 
note), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2805464 [https://perma.cc/HDJ4-TD4F]. 
20 See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 265.
21 Id. at 267. 
22 E.g., Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE,
supra note 7, at 33, 34–42; Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Conclusion: Preemption 
Doctrine and Its Limits, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS
309, 315 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
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owe to agencies’ statements about preemption.23 Presidents have also weighed 
in on the issue.24
This Article examines the impact of the ACA’s innovation waiver on 
preemption and develops a framework for assessing its desirability, drawing on 
the theoretical literatures of preemption and “big waiver.” The ACA’s 
innovation waiver, I argue here, offers an agency imprimatur model for 
managing preemptive conflicts that have frustrated health policy for decades. 
Through the ACA’s big waiver process, states must submit proposed legislation 
and detailed evidentiary support for their claims that state law variation will 
serve federal objectives “at least as comprehensive[ly] as” the federal law 
does.25 If the agency grants a waiver, the state commits to enacting the 
preapproved legislation; repeal of the state law invalidates the waiver.26
Congress thus delegated to HHS the power to give its imprimatur to state law, 
much of which would be subject to federal preemption if enacted without a 
waiver.27
Agency imprimatur infuses the health law federalism choice with more 
substantive precision than preemption doctrine allows. It permits state variations 
that serve federal legislative goals and uses the agency’s substantive expertise 
to guide these choices on a case-by-case basis as they are conceived. 
Preemption, by contrast, looks in hindsight to the drafting Congress’s 
                                                                                                                     
23 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 602 (2009) (giving Skidmore/Mead
deference to agency statement about the impact of preemption, but finding agency statement 
about preemptive impact of its regulations did not merit deference) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
id. at 583–85 (proposing rejection of obstacle preemption—whether used by agency or by 
court); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 863 (2000) (giving “some weight” to 
agency views about the impact of state law on federal objectives); William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
& Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1167–68 (2008); 
William Funk, Judicial Deference and Regulatory Preemption by Federal Agencies, 84 TUL.
L. REV. 1233, 1233–34 (2010); Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's 
Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE
L.J. 1933, 1970 (2008); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 697 (2008); David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1136–37 (2012); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption,
110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 528, 530 (2012) [hereinafter Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption];
Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina A. Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 7, at 13, 13–32. 
24 See, e.g., Memorandum on Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693 (2009) (stating 
executive policy on agency preemption, disfavoring agency statements on preemption unless 
sufficiently grounded in statutory delegation and preemption doctrine, as well as directing 
department heads to review preemption statements of the past ten years); cf. Exec. Order No. 
13,132, at §§ 2–3, 3 C.F.R., 1999 Comp., at 207–08 (1999) (requiring agencies to consider 
federalism values before promulgating preemptive regulations). 
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b) (2012).
26 Id. § 18052(b)(2)(B).
27 See id. § 18041(d).
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preemptive intent, applying canons of statutory interpretation and using courts’ 
transsubstantive interpretive expertise. 
Agency imprimatur also defuses potential preemption conflicts from at least 
two angles. First, it avoids disputes about preemption by giving ex ante federal 
approval to state law deviations and suspending the operation of supreme federal 
law. Thus, granting a waiver eliminates some nascent preemption conflicts that 
could otherwise end up in court. Second, if the agency’s decision about the 
sufficiency and desirability of a state variation—either a grant or a denial of a 
waiver—does end up in court, a court will use deferential review because it is 
an agency action pursuant to expertise and express delegation, not an agency 
opinion about preemptive effect, which is owed no deference.28
The imprimatur model considers how the fraught history of preemption 
jurisprudence might benefit from this agency-supervised, conflict-avoidance 
model of federalism. Health insurance regulation is particularly saturated with 
state law predating the ACA, and is the source of some of the most maligned 
preemption decisions from courts, particularly on the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).29 Through the waiver, the ACA 
ingeniously diverts the decision whether to preserve conflicting state law from 
courts to the agency, giving the agency a way to avoid conflicts in the first 
instance and reclaim some deference if challenged. The diversion to the agency 
emphasizes the agency’s expertise and “big-picture” perspective on substantive 
policy—whether state variation is desirable. And the shift to an imprimatur 
model makes the area of courts’ expertise—ad hoc application of the trans-
substantive interpretive canons—a secondary inquiry. 
Part II of this Article describes the health law landscape and preemption 
doctrine before the ACA, the preemptive power of the ACA’s insurance market 
reforms, and some of the recent legislative efforts to revise the ACA. Part III 
examines the details of the ACA’s section 1332 innovation waiver and the 
contours of its delegation to HHS, as well as the waiver’s contributions to “big 
waiver” theory. Part IV illustrates how this innovation waiver provision shifts 
the issue of permitted state law variation from ex post preemption analysis to ex
ante agency review of state legislation—and therefore from judicial preemption 
doctrine to an agency imprimatur model of preemption. Part IV then proposes 
metrics for assessing the benefits and detriments of this shift for health law 
federalism and access to affordable health care, accounting for institutional 
competencies and the values of uniformity and experimentation. 
This Article concludes with the observation that although the imprimatur 
model has much to commend it, its success depends on the strength of federal 
law and the expertise that the agency brings to bear. From an institutional 
                                                                                                                     
28 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 23, at 1202; Rubenstein, supra note 23, at 1150; see 
also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 139–40 (1944).
29 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 97.
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competence perspective, agencies can bring substantive expertise and big-
picture policy to the federalism analysis that courts confined to the post hoc 
application of preemption doctrine lack. And the agency imprimatur process 
infuses preemption choices with transparency, stakeholder participation, and 
direct communication between state and federal regulators that the litigation 
model cannot fully achieve. By encouraging state and federal agencies to 
directly confer on the balance of their authorities—against a backdrop of 
preemptive federal law—the agency imprimatur model fosters a more 
communicative mode of regulatory federalism. 
Still, the ACA’s innovation waiver may be both too demanding and too 
amorphous to realize its full potential. On one hand, the delegation allows HHS 
to grant waivers only if states can propose replacement legislation that is at least 
as protective as the ACA, but that is also budget neutral for the federal 
government. Practically, that is a difficult proposition that almost no state had 
approached prior to the ACA. Yet the innovation waiver also sets malleable 
standards by which HHS must evaluate states’ evidence of potential 
equivalence. There is thus plenty of room in the delegation for HHS to grant 
waivers for potentially restrictive variations with only speculative support, as 
well as to deny waivers for promising state variations.
Recent proposals in Congress have included major changes to section 1332 
waivers, which would create even more leeway for states to pursue waivers with 
very few protections and little, if any, evidentiary support. The Better Care 
Reconciliation Act of 2017 (BCRA),30 proposed the most dramatic expansion
to the section 1332 waiver mechanism.31 The BCRA draft removed the 
equivalence criteria from section 1332 (the Secretary may only grant waivers 
for state variations that are “as affordable” and “comprehensive” as the ACA 
while extending coverage to “at least as many” people).32 Instead, the BCRA
provided that the Secretary must grant any state’s application unless its plan 
would increase the federal deficit.33 Plus, the BCRA waiver automatically 
                                                                                                                     
30 Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (as passed by House,
May 4, 2017), https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BetterCareJuly13.2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J35U-ECAB].
31 Timothy Jost & Sara Rosenbaum, Unpacking the Senate’s Take on ACA Repeal and 
Replace, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (June 22, 2017), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/06/22/
unpacking-the-senates-take-on-aca-repeal-and-replace/ [https://perma.cc/UY67-N5WS]
(“Perhaps the most important private insurance market provision of the Senate bill comes 
near the end: its amendments to the 1332 state innovation waiver program.”). The other 
legislative attempts to replace the ACA in 2017, the “American Health Care Act,” the 
“Health Care Freedom Act,” and the Graham-Cassidy bill, all similarly took aim at section 
1332. See Compare Proposals To Replace the Affordable Care Act, HENRY J. KAISER FAM.
FOUND., https://www.kff.org/interactive/proposals-to-replace-the-affordable-care-act/
[https://perma.cc/5YQ8-3XF8].
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1).
33 H.R. 1628 § 207(a)(2)(A).
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extended to eight years and could only be shortened by the state.34 To get the 
BCRA version of a waiver, a state would need only to describe what it wants to 
do and how its plan might “provide for alternative means of . . . increasing
access . . . , reducing average premiums, . . . and increasing enrollment.”35 This 
is not so much a “big waiver” as it is a suspension of federal law on demand.
The changes proposed in the BCRA would have undone the agency 
imprimatur model’s benefits. The mega waiver would have preserved few of the 
protections, little of the statute’s priorities, and none of the agency expertise, 
while diminishing the opportunities for exchange of meaningful information 
between state and federal regulators. The BCRA mega waiver would not even
require a state to use the federal pass-through funding for health care, or any 
other specified purpose.36 The proposed mega waiver thus resembled not an 
alternative to preemption (like the original section 1332), but a reversal of 
preemption, making compliance with the expressly preemptive federal law 
optional at the state’s discretion. 
It remains unclear whether Congress ultimately will revive these 
proposals.37 If passed, the waiver expansions would allow states to ignore many 
of the ACA’s regulations prioritizing meaningful coverage to stem the tide of 
medical bankruptcies and erode the stabilizing influence of federal law. By 
removing the waiver standards, these repeal efforts could return health care 
markets to the pre-ACA scenario of varying rules by state and health insurance 
policies that exclude coverage for needed care. Further, the idea that states might 
return to running their own health insurance markets unfettered by federal 
regulations will confront the reality that other unwaivable statutes—namely 
ERISA—remain in place to frustrate state efforts. 
                                                                                                                     
34 See id. § 207(a)(4).
35 Id. § 207(a)(1)(A)(i)(I).
36 See Nicholas Bagley, Crazy Waivers: The Senate Bill Invites States To Gut Important 
Health Insurance Rules, VOX (June 23, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2017/6/23/15862268/waivers-federalism-senate-bill-essential-benefits 
[https://perma.cc/D9B4-8HLG] (“If state officials blow the Obamacare money on cocaine 
and hookers, there’s apparently nothing the federal government can do about it.”). 
37 See, e.g., Tiana Lowe, The Senate’s ‘Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017’ Finally 
Revealed, NAT’L REV. (June 22, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/
448881/senate-health-care-bill-revealed [https://perma.cc/AUD3-TYN5] (“More-conservative 
wings of the Senate may be won over by the expansion of ‘1332’ waivers, which allow for 
more state flexibility, but the bill maintains Obamacare’s rules regarding preexisting 
conditions, raising the question of the ‘death spiral,’ in which premiums spike as a result of 
removing the individual mandate and making risk pools more expensive.”); Robert Pear & 
Thomas Kaplan, Projected Drop in Medicaid Spending Heightens Hurdle for G.O.P. Health 
Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/us/politics/
health-care-bill-senate-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/RSF3-2Q6R]. It is additionally 
unclear whether parts of the proposals are properly part of Congress’s reconciliation powers 
at all. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Senate Rules Could Force GOP To Drop Key Policies in Health 
Bill, VOX (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/3/7/148456
86/ahca-reconciliation-senate-obamacare [https://perma.cc/7JW3-A3YG].
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The agency imprimatur model may preserve some of the ACA’s priorities 
in the face of repeal efforts.38 And it offers a useful model for revising or 
replacing the ACA’s waiver provisions. While the political turn of course casts 
significant doubt on the ACA’s continued existence as such, the innovation 
waiver’s model for addressing conflicts between state and federal laws offers 
some innovations on preemption with enduring value. In particular, the agency 
imprimatur model illustrates the value of preemptive federal baselines and 
principled standards for their waiver. 
II. HEALTH LAW PREEMPTIONS AND ACA REFORMS
Health law has a particularly complicated mix of federal and state 
regulation, and an enormously complex preemption picture. Federal, state, and 
local laws crowd the health law field.39 States’ general police powers and 
Congress’s enumerated police powers spawn enormous overlap in health care 
regulatory authorities.40 Neither has been shy about exercising their concurrent 
authority, nor have they regulated in concert. State and federal health laws have 
evolved haphazardly, sometimes in reaction to each other and sometimes at 
cross-purposes.41
Preemption doctrine has managed the collisions between state health laws 
and federal ones.42 The Supremacy Clause gives duly enacted federal law 
preemptive power over conflicting state law.43 But the ubiquitous questions 
                                                                                                                     
38 See, e.g., Timothy Jost, ACA Round-Up: Negotiations To Revive AHCA, Alexander-
Corker Bill, and Risk Adjustment, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Apr. 4, 2017), http://healthaffairs.
org/blog/2017/04/04/aca-round-up-negotiations-to-revive-ahca-alexander-corker-bill-and-risk-
adjustment/ [https://perma.cc/AD77-S253]; Molly E. Reynolds & Elizabeth Mann, In Wake of 
AHCA Failure, Will Trump Turn to States To Revise ACA?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/03/28/will-trump-turn-to-states-to-revise-aca/
[https://perma.cc/YG3X-MJV5]. See generally C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & JANET KINZER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43289, LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS IN THE 112TH, 113TH, AND 114TH 
CONGRESSES TO REPEAL, DEFUND, OR DELAY THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (Feb. 2017) 
(providing an overview of the ACA's core provisions and its impact on federal spending). 
39 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 100. See generally FIELD, supra note 2, at 168–69
(explaining the past and present conflicts between federal, state, and local laws that have 
influenced the oversight of the health care industry and the complexity of the regulatory 
structure today).
40 Nelson, supra note 5, at 225 (state and federal regulatory powers overlap 
“enormously”); Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 513
(2010); Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against 
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 254–55 (2011).
41 FIELD, supra note 2, at 142–43; see also id. at 168 (“The conflict between federal and 
state authority permeates American political history.”); Huberfeld, supra note 4, at 454–60 
(tracing the evolution of federalism in health care cases and lamenting the lack of coherence).
42 McCuskey, supra note 1, at 100.
43 See, e.g., Preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1368–69 (“The 
principle (derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can supersede or supplant 
any inconsistent state law or regulation.”); Merrill, supra note 5, at 733 (arguing that 
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about the scope of each law, divination of Congress’s legislative intent to 
preempt, and the bases and contours of preemption doctrine have complicated 
the managerial function. The complexity of concurrent health care regulation 
authority has obfuscated preemption doctrine and vice versa,44 contributing to 
the fragmentation of health care regulation and the health care system (or 
nonsystem) itself. 
The ACA entered this fragmented landscape with a mission to enact the first 
comprehensive federal health reform law, targeting cost and access through 
disparate parts of the health care system.45 In approaching this giant task, the 
ACA performs a delicate balancing act, simultaneously exerting a strident 
federal regulatory reach and an unprecedented deference to state authority in 
many areas. This Part illustrates the preemptive intent behind this 
comprehensive health care legislation and the major pillars on which it stands. 
A. Health Law Preemption Before the ACA
Heath care regulation has proceeded in piecemeal fashion since its 
inception. As science and regulation advanced, the concept of “health law” grew 
to encompass regulation of a health care system, or at least a complex set of 
interlocking parts forming a nonsystem.46 State and federal authorities overlap 
enormously in regulating “health”—largely owing to their concurrent police 
powers.47 Due to this overlap, preemption doctrine has played an outsized role 
in health care regulation and at times its fragmentation.48
Preemption doctrine has shaped health law, and health law cases have 
influenced the development of preemption doctrine’s increasingly complex 
taxonomy.49 The health care regulatory landscape before the ACA was thus 
littered with various preemptions that established some uniformity, but which 
                                                                                                                     
preemption derives from the Supremacy Clause); Nelson, supra note 5, at 225 n.3 (using 
“preemption” to “refer to the displacement of state law by federal statutes (or by courts 
seeking to fill gaps in federal statutes)”); cf. Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 781 (Necessary and 
Proper Clause).
44 McCuskey, supra note 1, at 135.
45 Alec MacGillis, Preface: The Best, the Worst, the Future, in LANDMARK, supra note 
11, at 65, 68.
46 See generally ELHAUGE, supra note 4 (describing the fragmentation of the U.S. health 
care system and possible methods of reform); Moseley, supra note 4 (explaining how U.S. 
systems for health care delivery and reimbursement have transitioned from a largely 
unregulated, free-market-type state in the early 1900s to a highly regulated state today). 
47 McCuskey, supra note 1, at 96–97.
48 Id.
49 Id.; see McCuskey, supra note 1, at 104; Rubenstein, supra note 23, at 1137–38
(outlining taxonomy); Schroeder, supra note 7, at 119–43 (detailing the Supreme Court’s 
development of this taxonomy); Louise Weinberg, The Federal–State Conflict of Laws: 
Actual Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (1992) (“The taxonomy is daunting.”). 
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also under-enforced important initiatives, undermined experimentation, and 
stymied coherent health care regulation.50
In regulation of medical treatments, for example, Congress’s awkward 
preemption statements (or silence) coupled with the Supreme Court’s
applications of preemption doctrine have produced some bizarre results. 
Curiously, Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of medical devices 
has been held to preempt state tort remedies,51 but FDA approval of different 
classes of drugs and different tort theories are treated differently, even from each 
other.52 FDA approval of brand name drugs does not preempt some tort 
remedies for faulty warnings, but approval of generic drugs does, via 
impossibility preemption.53 And design-defect torts are preempted against 
both.54 Further, the strong preemption scheme in the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act establishes certainty and centrality with a no-fault system 
for injury claims against vaccine makers.55 It supports the low-cost supply of 
vaccines essential for public health, but does so potentially at the expense of 
undercompensating some victims of injury.56
Health insurance regulation has been perhaps the health law topic most 
fraught with preemption.57 Preemption has protected the Medicaid public 
insurance program from some state laws undermining access, but not others.58
                                                                                                                     
50 See generally McCuskey, supra note 1, at 99–100 (identifying a tradition of 
presumption against preemption based on a notion of state primacy).
51 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' 
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 343–44 (2001) (preempting injury claims based on allegations 
of fraud in the approval process).
52 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in 
Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1013, 1019–20 
(2007) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalism in Action]; Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical 
Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 859 (2017).
53 See also Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Risk, Responsibility, and Generic Drugs, 367 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1679, 1679–81 (2012). Compare PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 
624 (2011) (preempting failure to warn claims against generic drugs), with Wyeth v. Levine, 
555 U.S. 555, 571–73 (2009) (holding failure to warn claims against brand name drugs not 
preempted).
54 See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013).
55 See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(e) (2012); 
see also Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 269 (1995) (“[T]he [Vaccine] Act establishes 
a scheme of recovery designed to work faster and with greater ease than the civil tort 
system.”). 
56 See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 229–30 (2011) (noting that the Act 
gives manufacturers significant tort-liability protections in exchange for the no-fault 
system); John D. Kraemer & Lawrence O. Gostin, Vaccine Liability in the Supreme Court: 
Forging a Social Compact, 305 JAMA 1900, 1901 (2011); Catherine M. Sharkey, Against 
Categorical Preemption: Vaccines and the Compensation Piece of the Preemption Puzzle,
61 DEPAUL L. REV. 643, 657 (2012) [hereinafter Sharkey, Against Categorical Preemption]. 
57 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 96–97.
58 See, e.g., Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cty., 563 U.S. 110, 113 (2011); Ark. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 292 (2006); cf. Douglas v. Indep. 
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On the other hand, ERISA has preempted many state efforts at expanding access 
to commercial health insurance provided by employers59 and collecting health 
insurance data.60 State health insurance regulation was historically the primary 
source of regulation.61 But the federal government assumed a major role in 
insurance regulation with the passage of the ERISA in 1974, leading to a host 
of intractable conflicts.62 Since then, the Supreme Court has lamented that the 
“unhelpful”63 drafting of ERISA’s preemption clause has “occupie[d] a 
substantial share of [the] Court’s time”64 and “generated an avalanche of 
litigation in the lower courts.”65
While state law can, and has, traditionally regulated insurance, ERISA’s 
complete preemption invalidates state regulatory efforts related to health 
insurance—if provided by an employer to its employees.66 Employer-sponsored 
insurance has been the largest source of health insurance for Americans for 
several decades, so ERISA preemption affects nearly half of all Americans.67
Yet ERISA also preserves state authority to regulate the commercial insurance 
industry, and the Supreme Court has spent substantial time on “[t]he ‘unhelpful’ 
                                                                                                                     
Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 610 (2012) (declining to rule on question whether 
private parties may maintain direct Supremacy Clause challenge to proposed state laws); id.
at 624 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“When Congress did not intend to provide a private right 
of action to enforce a statute enacted under the Spending Clause, the Supremacy Clause does 
not supply one of its own force.”); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 
667–68 (2003) (holding that state efforts at achieving cost savings by subjecting drugs 
without negotiated prices to prior authorization were not preempted).
59 E.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 195–97 (4th Cir. 2007). 
60 E.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016). 
61 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 135.
62 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)). 
63 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645, 656 (1995) (describing the language of ERISA’s preemption clauses as 
“unhelpful” to the interpretation of intent). 
64 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365 (2002).
65 De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 808 n.1 (1997); 
cf. Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 433, 
464–65 (2010) (noting that ERISA’s provisions regularly capture the Court’s attention).
66 See, e.g., Maher & Stris, supra note 65, at 464–65.
67 Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(2014), http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?dataView=0&current
Timeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22
%7D [https://perma.cc/NP6W-3Q3Q]; see also Elizabeth McCuskey, Access, Affordability, 
and the American Health Reform Dilemma, Part I: Genesis of the Affordable Care Act,
OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (Mar. 27, 2017), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/access-affordability-
and-the-american-health-reform-dilemma-part-i-genesis-of-the-affordable-care-act/
[https://perma.cc/26V3-V2TM] (noting that under the “piecemeal approach to health care 
coverage” about half of Americans depended on their employers to provide coverage).
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drafting of these antiphonal clauses”68 with little clarity on where the 
preemptive line between the two should be drawn.
ERISA preempts state-law remedies for coverage denials under an 
employer-sponsored policy.69 And ERISA preempts state regulatory efforts to 
encourage or support employer-sponsored insurance, including preemption of 
most state-law “employer mandate” statutes that prompt employers to share 
responsibility for the health care costs of employees.70
Despite preempting state regulatory efforts, ERISA and its revisions offered 
scant federal regulation of health insurance to fill the preemptive void.71 For 
example, ERISA preempts state employer mandates,72 but does not enact a 
federal mandate. ERISA preempts state laws on the content of employer-
sponsored insurance, but offers very little federal law on the content of those 
policies.73 Just within the past year, for example, the Supreme Court held in 
Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. that ERISA preempts even a state’s 
efforts to collect health insurance claims data from certain employer health 
plans—data that those plans already collect for themselves.74 Yet ERISA does 
not require any similar federal collection of data.75 While the Federal 
Department of Labor could collect that data and distribute it to states, it does not 
do so.76
                                                                                                                     
68 Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 364–65 (citation omitted). 
69 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214 (2004).
70 E.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 195–97 (4th Cir. 2007).
71 See Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How To Fix 
It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 464–66 (2003); see also 
Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employer-Based Anything, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1257, 1270–
71 (2016) (noting that ERISA gets “terrible marks for its regulation of health and disability 
insurance”).
72 See, e.g., Fielder, 475 F.3d at 192–93.
73 See, e.g., Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), 29 
U.S.C. § 1161(a) (2012) (requiring extension after separating from employment); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1169(d) (2012) (requiring some coverage for pediatric vaccines); Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (2012) (restricting 
the use of preexisting condition limitations in employment-based plans); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1185(a)(1) (2012) (requiring some coverage for aspects of childbirth); Mental Health 
Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012) (prohibiting imposition of certain limitations 
on coverage for mental health); 29 U.S.C. § 1185b(a) (2012) (requiring some coverage for 
reconstructive surgery after mastectomies).
74 Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 945 (2016).
75 Id. at 949–50 (Breyer, J., concurring).
76 See id.; cf. Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why 
(and How) It Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2323, 2341–43, 2380–81
(2010) (arguing that Aetna v. Davila’s elimination of private Employer Sponsored Insurance 
(ESI) contract enforcement could empower a more effective federal regulator to pursue 
policy, but lamenting the lack of federal enforcement funding and agency will). 
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The Supreme Court decided yet another preemption case about employer-
sponsored health insurance in Coventry Health Care of Missouri v. Nevils.77
Coventry Health concerns the preemptive scope of a federal statute governing 
the federal government’s provision of health benefits to federal employees—the 
Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA)78—akin to the ERISA but 
affecting federal government employers. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Coventry Health to address “an increasing disagreement” among the courts 
“over when to apply the presumption against preemption”—specifically on the 
question of whether federal law preempts health insurers’ subrogation suits 
against tort victims.79 The Court held that the FEHBA’s preemption provision, 
like ERISA’s, does preempt subrogation laws.80
ERISA and its preemption jurisprudence left large voids in health insurance 
regulation and significant variation among states.81 As my prior work has 
explained, state law was the primary regulation for the content of commercial 
health insurance policies.82 Even under ERISA, states could set coverage 
minimums for health insurers.83 A handful of federal laws had added preemptive 
bits and pieces to states’ coverage and eligibility regulations by prohibiting 
discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, and disability;84
requiring extension after separating from employment;85 requiring parity 
between mental health and other benefits,86 pediatric vaccines,87 childbirth,88
and specific treatments; as well as restricting the use of preexisting condition 
                                                                                                                     
77 Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 137 S. Ct. 1190, 1194 (2017). 
78 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901–8914 (2012); Coventry Health, 137 S. Ct. at 1194; see also Empire 
Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh ex rel. Estate of McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 682 
(2006) (“The [FEHBA] establishes a comprehensive program of health insurance for federal 
employees.”).
79 Brief for Respondent at 13, Coventry Health, 137 S. Ct. 1190 (No. 16-149); Coventry 
Health, 137 S. Ct. 446, 446 (2016) (mem.) (granting certiorari); Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari at 17–19, Coventry Health, 137 S. Ct. 1190 (No. 16-149) (identifying circuit split); 
McCuskey, supra note 1, at 153.
80 Coventry Health, 137 S. Ct. at 1194.
81 See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Essay, The Rhetoric Hits the Road: State Challenges 
to the Affordable Care Act Implementation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 784 (2012) (noting that 
ERISA preemption “has constrained states' ability to regulate” employer-sponsored 
insurance, but that states remained free to enact other reforms).
82 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 136.
83 See id. at 112.
84 E.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012); Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7 (2012). 
85 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1161(a) (2012). 
86 Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012).
87 29 U.S.C. § 1169(d) (2012). 
88 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) (2012). 
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limitations in employment-based plans.89 But no comprehensive, uniform set of 
regulations existed for commercial health insurance plans nationally.90 ERISA 
preempted state efforts to regulate the employer-sponsored coverage, and 
thereby created a void in which states could not regulate,91 but offered very little 
federal regulation to fill that space.
On this scattered landscape, the ACA added a definitive set of federal 
regulations, including standards for coverage and eligibility, regulations on the 
business of commercial health insurers, reforms to the insurance markets, as 
well as mandates for certain employers to provide insurance and for all 
individuals to have it.92 By crafting federal regulation of all sectors in the market 
for health care coverage, the ACA promised to rebalance the historical 
relationship between state and federal regulatory authority, at least in part.93
B. The ACA as Preemptive Federal Law
The health reform momentum behind the ACA was aimed primarily at 
reducing the economic drain of uninsured medical care (and lack thereof) and 
the tragic consequences of medical bankruptcies.94 Health care spending had 
accelerated over the decades preceding the ACA to consume 17% of GDP, 
draining the economy while producing less favorable health outcomes than in 
countries which spend only half as much.95 Disturbingly, the burden of these 
outsized health care expenditures laid most heavily on those who could ill afford 
it: the uninsured and underinsured.96
“The ACA tackled the affordability of care largely by engaging third-party 
payors (insurers) and expanding access to care, rather than directly addressing 
                                                                                                                     
89 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1181(a) (2012).
90 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 135–38.
91 See Weeks Leonard, supra note 81, at 784.
92 See generally Summary of the Affordable Care Act, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-the-affordable-care-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/QL3H-D9UV].
93 But see Sara Rosenbaum, Can This Marriage Be Saved? Federalism and the Future 
of U.S. Health Policy Under the Affordable Care Act, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 167, 173 
(2014) (“In many respects, the basic approach to the regulation of health insurance in the
United States remains undisturbed under the Act.”). 
94 See Elizabeth McCuskey, Access, Affordability, and the American Health Reform 
Dilemma, Part II: The Affordable Care Act’s First Seven Years, OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS 
HUB (Mar. 28, 2017), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/access-affordability-and-the-american-health-
reform-dilemma-part-ii-the-affordable-care-acts-first-seven-years/ [https://perma.cc/KM74-
VEUN].
95 See MacGillis, supra note 45, at 64–67.
96 See, e.g., Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Life or Debt: 
Underinsurance in America, 28 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1122, 1123 (2013); Jenny Gold, The 
‘Underinsurance’ Problem Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 28, 2009), 
http://khn.org/news/underinsured-explainer/ [https://perma.cc/R79A-898N].
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the price of care.”97 As a comprehensive reform statute aimed at improving 
affordability and access, the ACA wove together moderate reforms across the 
layers of the health care system, including insurance, quality of care, and 
access.98 But the ACA focused primarily on paying for health care, either 
through private health insurance or public insurance programs.99 First and 
foremost, the ACA aimed to increase the number of Americans covered by 
health insurance to as near universal coverage as possible.100
1. The Pillars of Federal Health Insurance Reform
The statute’s foundational reforms approach cost by expanding access to 
health insurance coverage:101 requiring individuals to have insurance through 
the individual mandate;102 giving them more access to sources of insurance with 
health insurance exchanges,103 expanded Medicaid,104 and required employer-
sponsored insurance;105 and regulating the coverage insurers can offer.106
The ACA regulates the content and issuance of health insurance policies, 
both commercial and government sponsored.107 Before the ACA, federal 
coverage regulations were piecemeal and scant, comprised mainly of anti-
discrimination provisions in the Americans with Disabilities Act, a few required 
                                                                                                                     
97 McCuskey, supra note 94, at 2; Goldstein, supra note 11, at 73. See generally STEVEN 
BRILL, AMERICA’S BITTER PILL: MONEY, POLITICS, BACKROOM DEALS, AND THE FIGHT TO
FIX OUR BROKEN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (2015) (critiquing the Affordable Care Act and 
chronicling its history).
98 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20, 21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 36, 42 U.S.C.); 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 to -19a (2012) (making reforms aimed at improving insurance 
coverage, including provisions on quality of care, cost, and patient protections). 
99 See Office of the Legislative Counsel, 111th Cong., Compilation of Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010), at 13–78 (summarizing Title I of the ACA); 
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 12, at 135–46 (highlighting insurance 
provisions and Medicaid expansion).
100 See Goldstein, supra note 11, at 73 (describing expanded insurance coverage as 
“Priority One” in drafting the legislation). 
101 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§§ 1001–1004, 1101–1105, 1201, 1251–1253, 1301–1304, 1311–1313, 1321–1324, 1331–
1333, 1341–1343, 1401–1402, 1411–1415, 1421, 1501–1502, 1511–1515, 1551–1563, 124 
Stat. 119, 130–271 (2010) (Title I). 
102 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012); see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 
519, 561–65 (2012) (upholding individual mandate as a tax, after rejecting Commerce Clause 
authorization). See generally Summary of the Affordable Care Act, supra note 92.
103 E.g., 42 U.S.C.§ 18031(b)(1) (2012).
104 E.g., id. § 1396a(a) (Supp. I 2014).
105 E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2012).
106 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18022(a) (2012).
107 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119, §§ 1001–1004, 1101–1105, 1201, 124 Stat. 119, 130–162 (2010).
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coverage items from ERISA, and process regulations for employer-sponsored 
plans also from ERISA.108 Commercial insurers had to cover those items 
specified in each state, but remained free to exclude any other coverage items.109
Crucially, before the ACA, most state laws permitted insurers to use medical 
underwriting to account for health status in a number of ways: by refusing to 
issue policies to individuals with preexisting conditions, by charging vastly 
higher premiums, and also by excluding the preexisting conditions from 
coverage under those expensive policies.110
The ACA enacted the first comprehensive set of regulations for all 
commercial health insurance plans on issuance, coverage, and administration.111
On issuance, the ACA requires health plans to accept all applicants (known as 
“guaranteed issuance”), whether group or individual,112 and to renew that 
coverage at the enrollee’s request.113 Under the ACA, insurers may not enforce 
eligibility rules based on health status or history.114
On coverage, the ACA’s comprehensive coverage regulations prohibit 
lifetime and annual limits on benefits,115 rescission of insurance during the plan 
year,116 and medical underwriting.117 Under the ACA, health plans must include
coverage for preexisting conditions,118 cover “preventive health services” 
without a co-pay or deductible,119 provide the option to include adult children 
up to age twenty-six as dependents on the policy,120 use uniform explanations 
and definitions of coverage in plain language,121 and implement effective 
internal appeals processes for enrollees.122 If a plan chooses to include certain 
                                                                                                                     
108 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 123–41.
109 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 128–29; Summary of Coverage Provisions in the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 17, 2012), 
http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/summary-of-coverage-provisions-in-the-patient
[https://perma.cc/F8N6-R49T].
110 See Summary of Coverage Provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, supra note 109.
111 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1001–1004, 1101–1105, 1201
(prescribing “immediate improvements” and “actions” to expand quality health care 
coverage).
112 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (2012). Insurers may, however, restrict new enrollments to 
designated enrollment “periods.” Id. § 300gg-1(b)(1).
113 Id. § 300gg-2(a).
114 Id. § 300gg-4(a)(1), (5).
115 Id. § 300gg-11(a)(1).
116 Id. § 300gg-12.
117 Id. § 300gg(a)(1) (“prohibiting discriminatory premium rates” based on any factors 
other than household size, geographic rating area, age, and tobacco use).
118 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a) (2012).
119 Id. § 300gg-13(a).
120 Id. § 300gg-14(a).
121 Id. § 300gg-15(b).
122 Id. § 300gg-19(a).
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coverage items, like primary care provider designations and emergency room 
visits, then the ACA prohibits certain restrictions on that coverage.123 The ACA 
regulates plans sold on the exchanges at a more granular level, requiring 
certification that those plans offer ten categories of “essential health benefits” 
(EHBs) and satisfy extra marketing, administration, and financial protections.124
The ACA built upon the existing source-dependent insurance regulation 
landscape, rather than radically altering it.125 The law’s incremental approach 
has been aptly described as “evolutionary, not revolutionary.”126 The source of 
one’s insurance coverage “still determines the nature and extent of [its] 
regulation.”127 While the ACA sets some uniform federal priorities in coverage 
regulation, it also permits some significant state-by-state variations.128 Overall, 
the ACA maintained much of the preexisting distribution of health care 
coverage, concentrating regulatory effort on the individual market for insurance 
and existing public programs.129
2. Preemptive Intent
The ACA wrote an awful lot of new federal law, particularly concentrated 
in areas with significant preexisting state law, like insurance.130 The ACA 
preserved the existing structures of health care access and took great pains to 
enlist states in a cooperative federalism reform relationship.131 Yet, the ACA
                                                                                                                     
123 See id. § 300gg-19a(a)–(b), (d) (including primary care provider designation, 
immediate access to emergency care, and prohibition on referral requirements for obstetrical 
and gynecological services).
124 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18021–18024 (setting requirements for the “Available Coverage 
Choices for All Americans”). 
125 See Rosenbaum, supra note 93, at 173 (“In many respects, the basic approach to the 
regulation of health insurance in the United States remains undisturbed under the [Affordable 
Care] Act.”).
126 Alec MacGillis, Preface: The Best, the Worst, the Future, in LANDMARK, supra note 
11, at 68; see also Jamie Fletcher & Jane Marriott, Beyond the Market: The Role of 
Constitutions in Health Care System Convergence in the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 455, 470 (2014) (finding the same).
127 McCuskey, supra note 94.
128 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, 
Medicaid, and the Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1753 
(2013) (“Congress gave the states a lead role in the [ACA] in those same areas in which 
states had previously exerted primary authority, namely, Medicaid and insurance 
regulation.”).
129 See, e.g., Fletcher & Marriott, supra note 126, at 458.
130 See Abbe R. Gluck, Essay, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: 
State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L.J. 534, 580–
82 (2011).
131 See, e.g., id. at 582–94. 
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“contains many contact points between federal and state law.”132 And Congress 
did, in many respects, express its wishes for preemption in the ACA, both 
specifically and generally.133
Congressional intent stands as the “ultimate touchstone” for preemption 
doctrine,134 and Congress may express or merely imply its intent.135 Congress 
has conveyed its intent with varying degrees of force and clarity, and it may also 
delegate its preemptive lawmaking authority to agencies.136 When drafting the 
ACA, Congress had a buffet of preemption options from which to draw, as 
health law topics are peppered with preemption in nearly all of its species: 
complete, field, conflict, and obstacle preemption.137
The most forceful form of preemption is complete preemption, which 
applies when “a federal statute's preemptive force [is] so extraordinary and all-
encompassing that it converts an ordinary state-common-law complaint into one 
stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded-complaint rule”138 and 
precludes any state claim on the subject.139 Health law has one of the only three 
recognized complete preemptions: ERISA preemption, which completely 
preempts remedies for coverage denials under employer-sponsored health 
insurance benefits.140
Field preemption—almost as rare as complete preemption—arises from a 
federal regulatory scheme “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it” or from a federal interest “so dominant” that federal law 
is “assumed to preclude enforcement of state law” in that field.141 The Supreme 
Court has thus far rejected field preemption for the health laws it has 
adjudicated, though field preemption arguably remains within the sphere of 
                                                                                                                     
132 Brendan S. Maher, The Affordable Care Act, Remedy, and Litigation Reform, 63 AM.
U. L. REV. 649, 702 (2014).
133 See id. at 703. But see 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2012) (“Nothing in this title shall be 
construed to preempt any state law that does not prevent the application of the provisions in 
this title.”).
134 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Retail Clerks Int’l 
Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)); see also Merrill, supra note 
5, at 740 (describing the “touchstone” as a maxim of preemption).
135 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 227.
136 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883–86 (2000) (holding that federal 
regulations may preempt state law).
137 McCuskey, supra note 1, at 111.
138 Complete-Preemption Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 345.
139 Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). 
140 See Gil Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 550–
52 (2007). The other two complete preemptions are found in the Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2012), and the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 38 (2012).
141 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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agency power.142 The federal statute on cigarette regulation,143 for example, 
gives the FDA significant power to regulate tobacco, but the statute does not fill 
the field or even preempt conflicting requirements in state misrepresentation 
claims.144 Field preemption at the state level, however, has wiped out local 
ordinances on issues like tobacco control.145
Conflict preemption—by far the most ubiquitous form of preemption—
applies when federal and state law conflict with each other. Conflict preemption 
can arise in either of two ways: impossibility conflicts and obstacles.146
Impossibility preemption wipes out state law when it would be impossible to 
comply with both state and federal law.147 Obstacle preemption wipes out state 
laws that impede federal goals even where simultaneous compliance is 
technically possible.148
Impossibility preemption applies to all kinds of federal health laws. For 
example, where the FDA has approved label warnings on prescription drugs, 
but state tort law would create liability for failure to include additional
warnings, impossibility preemption eclipses the state-law warnings only if the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) would prohibit including 
additional warnings.149 For brand-name drugs, the FDCA would permit these 
additional warnings, and therefore impossibility preemption would not apply.150
But the federal law on labeling for generic drugs required their labels to 
perfectly mirror the brand name label, thus the manufacturer could not comply 
simultaneously with the FDA’s verbatim requirement and a state law 
requirement of additional information.151 Impossibility preemption negated the
state tort law warning.152
Obstacle preemption is a broader, more nebulous form of conflict 
preemption. Obstacle preemption displaces state law even where state law 
merely “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress” without creating an impossible 
conflict.153 Even if, for example, a state law goes further than a federal law 
                                                                                                                     
142 See Zettler, supra note 52, at 871–72.
143 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (2012).
144 Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 91 (2008).
145 See, e.g., Altadis U.S.A., Inc. v. Prince George’s Cty., 65 A.3d 118, 123 (Md. 2013) 
(holding that state law occupied the field of “packaging [and] sale . . . of tobacco products” 
and therefore preempted county ordinances); James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Public Health 
“Preemption Plus,” 45 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 156, 156 (2017). 
146 Nelson, supra note 5, at 227–29.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 228 n.15.
150 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009).
151 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 625–26 (2011).
152 Id. at 618, 625.
153 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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(making it possible to comply with both), additional state requirements may 
frustrate Congress’s statutory intent for uniformity.154 Exactly what constitutes 
a sufficient “obstacle” remains a “matter of judgment” in light of “the federal 
statute as a whole and . . . its purpose and intended effects,”155 which is highly 
discretionary.156
Jurists and commentators have criticized obstacle preemption doctrine as 
“freewheeling”157 or worse, a discretionary doctrine that functions as a “thinly 
veiled means to instantiate judicial policy preferences.”158 And Caleb Nelson’s 
seminal article, Preemption, argued that obstacle preemption flows from a 
misreading of the Supremacy Clause itself.159 Its defenders, however, explain 
that obstacle preemption “plays an appropriate and indeed almost inescapable 
judicial role in our modern polity” by offering principles for filling in the 
inevitable gaps between legislative drafting and unforeseen circumstances.160
Courts have applied obstacle preemption to health regulations, but often without 
consistency across fields of health care.161
With congressional intent as the focus of preemption doctrine, Congress 
may choose to express its desired preemption or nonpreemption, or to stay silent 
and preempt only by implication. Further, many statutes include saving clauses 
                                                                                                                     
154 E.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74 (2000) (holding 
that federal sanctions against Myanmar preempted Massachusetts’s broader sanctions as an 
obstacle). 
155 Id. at 373.
156 Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 39 (2013). 
157 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)
(criticizing obstacle preemption as “freewheeling, extratextual”). But see PLIVA, 564 U.S. 
at 640 n.13 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[Justice Thomas’s] position . . . has not been 
accepted by this Court, and it thus should not justify [a] novel expansion of impossibility 
pre-emption.”). 
158 Maher, supra note 132, at 703 (summarizing critiques); accord. John David 
Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle Preemption, 47 GA. L. REV. 369, 372–73 (2013) 
(surveying commentary). 
159 Nelson, supra note 5, at 265. 
160 Meltzer, supra note 156, at 7, 37–38; see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Against 
Freewheeling, Extratextual Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice Clarence Thomas the Lone 
Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY. 63, 77, 93, 112 (2010) (finding express 
preemption often requires reading the whole statute in context, and contextual inquiry gives 
courts discretion to infer purpose).
161 See Diana R.H. Winters, The Magical Thinking of Food Labeling: The NLEA as a 
Failed Statute, 89 TUL. L. REV. 815, 834 (2015) (citing state case that applied obstacle 
preemption to the NLEA after finding that the statute’s express preemption provision did not 
apply). 
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identifying particular state laws Congress intends to preserve,162 or expressing 
intent for conflict-only preemption.163
a. Express Preemption 
The ACA sampled from all these preemption mechanisms and forms.164
From this buffet of preemption options, Congress ultimately chose to include a 
muddled statement of conflict preemption in the ACA’s insurance reforms.
For all of its private insurance regulations in Title I, the ACA includes a 
general express preemption provision. The statute states that, “[n]othing in 
[Title I] shall be construed to preempt any State law that does not prevent the 
application of the provisions of [Title I].”165 Stated in negative terms, the 
insurance preemption provision at first appears to be a saving clause, preserving 
specified state law from preemption’s reach.166 In form and function, however, 
the provision actually saves only those state laws that would be beyond 
preemption doctrine’s reach anyway. State laws that do not directly conflict with 
                                                                                                                     
162 See Rubenstein, supra note 23, at 1181; e.g., McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1012(b) (2012) (preserving state regulatory authority over the “business of insurance”); 29 
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (2012) (ERISA’s saving clause).
163 See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) 
(2012) (preserving state law that does not conflict with federal law); Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1370 (2012) (preserving state requirements except those “less stringent” than 
federal law). 
164 E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 343 note (2012) (Construction of Amendment by Pub. L. 111-148) 
(“Nothing [in the chain restaurant labeling section] shall be construed . . . to preempt [state 
law], unless [state law] establishes . . . nutrient content disclosures of the type required under
[the ACA’s additions to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act].”); id. (“Nothing [in the 
ACA section] shall be construed . . . to apply to any State . . . requirement . . . that provides 
for a warning [regarding food safety or food components].”); 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(4) (2012) 
(saving “State law that provides greater protections to employees” than the ACA section 
about nursing time for working mothers does); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-8(h) (2012) (“[The ACA 
requirement for coverage of participation in clinical trials does not] preempt State laws that 
require a clinical trials policy . . . that is in addition to the [ACA requirements].”); id.
§ 300gg-15(e) (“The [ACA’s required streamlined and standardized explanations of 
coverage] shall preempt any related State standards that require a summary . . . that provides 
less information.”); id. § 1320a-7h(d)(3)(A) (“[T]his section shall preempt any statute or 
regulation of a State . . . that requires an applicable manufacturer . . . to disclose or report, in 
any format, the type of information [required in the ACA].”); id.§ 1320a-7h(d)(3)(B) to -
7(d)(3)(B)(i) (“[This section] shall not preempt [state law requiring disclosure of 
information] not of the type required to be disclosed [under the ACA].”); id.§ 18023(c)(1) 
(“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to preempt . . . State laws regarding . . . coverage, 
funding, or procedural requirements on abortions . . . .”).
165 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2012) (emphasis added).
166 See Meltzer, supra note 156, at 12–14 (surveying saving clauses); cf., e.g., 9 U.S.C. 
§ 2 (2012) (Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) saving clause); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (2012) 
(ERISA saving clause covering the business of insurance); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343, 352 (2011) (holding that the FAA’s saving clause did not 
exempt state rule refusing to honor unconscionable class action waivers).
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the ACA’s insurance regulations would not be impossibility preempted, so it is 
more of an expression of conflict preemption than it is a saving clause.
Despite being expressed, the general preemption provision leaves 
significant ambiguity on which of the many kinds of conflict preemption it 
intends to invoke. Does the general provision contemplate solely impossibility 
preemption, or does it express a desire for obstacle preemption,167 impossibility 
preemption’s “freewheeling” sibling?168 The application of straightforward 
impossibility preemption goes without saying,169 as “neither an express pre-
emption provision nor a saving clause ‘bar[s] the ordinary working of conflict 
pre-emption principles.’”170 If the general provision intends impossibility 
preemption, it is inexplicably superfluous and strangely worded, unlike the 
statute’s other obvious statements of impossibility conflict preemption.171 Had 
Congress wanted the courts to stop at impossibility preemption for a general 
rule of construction, it could have expressed its intent more clearly. 
Instead the general preemption provision wipes out state laws that “prevent 
the application” of the ACA.172 “Prevent the application of” is hardly a legal 
term of art, though it recently has cropped up in various health law contexts.173
The most relevant recent uses appear in ERISA and the related Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA),174 as well as in the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).175 ERISA and 
MHPAEA include cross-referenced provisions expressing intent that they not 
                                                                                                                     
167 Maher, supra note 132, at 702. 
168 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (referring 
to “purposes and objectives” preemption as “freewheeling, extratextual, and broad”). 
169 Maher, supra note 132, at 702 n.255.
170 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 343, 352 (2001) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)). 
171 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(4) (2012) (preempting state law that requires less and 
preserving “State law that provides greater protections”); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-8(h) (2012) 
(preempting state law that requires less, but saving state laws imposing requirements “in 
addition to” the ACA’s); id. § 300gg-15(e) (preempting state law that “provides less”). 
172 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2012).
173 E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat’l Park Med. Ctr., Inc., 413 F.3d 897, 908 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (“[E]ven if a state law is saved from preemption because it relates to insurance, 
the deemer clause prevents the application of that [state] law to self-funded ERISA plans.” 
(emphasis added)); Impact on Md. Law of the Paul Wellstone and Peter Domenici Mental 
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (“Parity Act”), 94 Op. Att’y Gen. Md. 3, 16 
(2009) [hereinafter Maryland Letter] (opining that state-mandated insurance coverage for 
mental health and substance abuse benefits does not “prevent the application of” the Federal 
Mental Health Parity Acts and “therefore, . . . [is] not preempted”); cf. In re Aircrash in Bali
v. PanAm World Airways, Inc., 684 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding state law that 
“necessarily conflicts with” the Warsaw Convention was preempted “to the extent [it] would 
prevent the application of” the federal law). 
174 Sources cited infra note 178.
175 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 
§ 704(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1936, 1946–47 (1996).
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be “construed to supersede any provision of State law [on group insurance] 
except to the extent that such standard or requirement prevents the application
of a requirement” of the MHPAEA.176 A House conference report suggested 
HIPAA’s drafters intended the provision to invoke the “narrowest” preemption 
of state laws, and it also suggested that broader state protections would not 
“prevent the application of” the statute.177
Whether the drafters’ conception of the “narrowest” preemption was all
judicially-recognized conflict preemption (impossibility and obstacle) or solely 
impossibility preemption remains unclear.178 Because the general preemption 
provision is the ACA’s statement of intent for the insurance market reforms, it 
seems likely that the ERISA/MHPAEA/HIPAA language was at least 
contextually relevant to the choice of terms. Yet it also seems unclear how far 
“prevent the application” extends.179
The ACA general preemption provision180 could be read to preempt state 
law impediments beyond just those that impossibly conflict with the insurance 
reforms. On the one hand, “prevent” seems more determinate than obstacle 
preemption’s hallmark language of “stand[] as an obstacle to.”181 And a statute’s 
“application” seems more concrete and pragmatic than its “purposes and 
objectives.”182 Of course, had Congress wished to unmistakably invoke obstacle 
preemption, it could have just used the well-established phrasing of “obstacle” 
to Congressional “purposes and objectives.”183 By choosing “prevent the 
application,” Congress could have intended something slightly narrower than 
                                                                                                                     
176 29 U.S.C. § 1191(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-23(a)(1) (2012) 
(emphasis added); see 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,252 (Nov. 13, 2013) (explaining that ERISA’s 
preemption provisions and implementing regulations extend to the MHPAEA).
177 H.R. REP. NO. 104-736, at 205 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
178 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 942–44 (2013) (chronicling drafters’ unfamiliarity with the contours 
and operation of preemption canons).
179 Maryland Letter, supra note 173, at 16 (noting that state law mandating insurance 
coverage for mental health would not “prevent the application of” the MHPAEA, requiring 
the same thing).
180 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2012).
181 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
182 Application, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/application [https://perma.cc/3L2G-94NN] (last updated Nov. 19, 
2017) (defining “application” to include putting to use or administering, as well as the
“practical conclusion or lesson to be derived” from a discourse; it is synonymous with 
“operation” or “employment”). 
183 See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; Objective, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/objectives [https://perma.cc/E4J6-CLLN] (last 
updated Nov. 19, 2017) (showing that “objectives,” by contrast, are synonymous with hopes, 
ambitions, and goals—the desired ends).
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obstacle preemption, yet broader than impossibility preemption.184 Despite 
being an express preemption provision, it is a muddle.
The few courts that have had the opportunity to interpret the ACA’s general 
preemption provision have given it mixed effect as well. Whereas a district court 
found that the provision “does little more than invoke conflict preemption,” 
broadly defined to include both impossibility and obstacle,185 on appeal the 
Eighth Circuit determined that “[t]his preemption clause is a narrow one, and 
only those state laws that ‘hinder or impede’ the implementation of the ACA 
run afoul of the Supremacy Clause.”186 The district court had invalidated any 
state attempt to regulate ACA insurance navigators as an obstacle, but the Eighth 
Circuit remanded for the district court to consider § 18041(d)’s more “limited” 
preemptive effects, namely the limitation to conflict preemption.187
The ACA’s insurance preemption definitively expresses intent to preempt 
(as opposed to save) and legislates conflict preemption, as opposed to the 
heavier complete or field preemptions.188 Whether Congress intended its 
expression to constrain excessive discretion by limiting obstacle preemption or 
to preserve obstacle preemption in the face of mounting judicial resistance to 
the doctrine remains unclear.189
The ACA’s muddled clarity on preemptive intent creates some uncertainty 
on how far states may go toward enacting additional health reforms or enforcing 
existing laws. Certainly, under either reading the ACA’s insurance market 
reforms preempt state laws that are less stringent and therefore create an 
                                                                                                                     
184 See Maher, supra note 132, at 703 (posing that the provision might be “narrower” 
than obstacle preemption, included as a “curb” to courts’ use of broad obstacle preemption, 
but observing that “neither the height nor slope of the curb contained in § 18041(d) is self-
evident”). On the other hand, “prevent” is defined as “hinder or impede,” Prevent, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (10th ed. 2014), and “impediment” is synonymous with “obstacle,” 
Impediment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE THESAURUS, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/thesaurus/impediment [https://perma.cc/P52T-4WQZ] (“impediment” synonyms).
185 St. Louis Effort for AIDS v. Huff, 996 F. Supp. 2d 798, 802 (W.D. Mo. 2014).
186 St. Louis Effort for AIDS v. Huff, 782 F.3d 1016, 1022 (8th Cir. 2015).
187 Id. at 1022, 1028.
188 See Maher, supra note 132, at 702 & n.254; see also Am. Council of Life Insurers v. 
D.C. Health Benefit Exch. Auth., 73 F. Supp. 3d 65, 82 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The ACA expressly 
grants the States the choice of operating their own Exchanges, pursuant to state law, rather 
than adopt [sic] a Federal Exchange, plainly undercutting any perceived congressional intent 
to control the entire field of local Exchanges.” (citation omitted)), vacated, 815 F.3d 17, 21 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (vacated for lack of jurisdiction).
189 Within conflict preemption, the ACA’s chosen language invokes synonyms of 
“obstacle,” and contemporaneous courts recognized obstacle preemption, see Ohlendorf, 
supra note 158, at 372, though with diminishing regularity, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 
555, 604 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). The general provision thus can be fairly read to 
encompass both impossibility (the narrower form) and obstacle (the broader form) conflict 
preemption.
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impossibility conflict.190 State health insurance laws requiring only nine of the 
ten essential health benefits—or not mandating categories of benefits at all—
could not be enforced in light of the ACA’s EHB regulations. 
The extension to obstacle preemption, however, would become crucial in 
determining the fate of state laws that impose different requirements (like 
establishing a coverage minimum at some actuarial payment level), additional 
requirements (like requiring coverage for fertility treatment not on the EHB list), 
or establishing parallel systems (like creating a separate exchange for Medicare 
Part C plans). These state activities would not necessarily produce an impossible 
choice because compliance with both is technically achievable. But the 
disuniformity (coverage minimums), added cost (for additional mandatory 
benefits), and potential for confusion and diversion (with multiple exchanges) 
could each pose “obstacles” or “impediments” to the implementation of the 
ACA’s universal coverage and affordability scheme. 
Obstacle preemption might best serve the purposes of the ACA because 
obstacle preemption is especially useful in adapting statutory language to 
unforeseen or evolving circumstances, which abound in health care 
regulation.191 Further, obstacle preemption is particularly well-suited to a statute 
that heavily delegates rulemaking to agencies, as the ACA does, because 
obstacle preemption’s flexibility recognizes that these rules will not be set at the 
time the statute is enacted.192 Adaptability is a benefit that obstacle preemption 
shares with big waiver, discussed below.193
Despite this flexibility, one statutory obstacle remains. None of the ACA’s 
preemption statements, under any reading, put a dent in ERISA preemption.194
Although the ACA directly regulated employer-sponsored insurance in ways 
that ERISA had prevented states from doing, the ACA did nothing to alter the 
preemptive force of ERISA.195 The Supreme Court in Gobeille further noted 
that the ACA should not be construed to alter ERISA’s application, but passed 
                                                                                                                     
190 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 228 & n.15; Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State 
Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1753–54 (1992) (actual 
conflicts). 
191 See Meltzer, supra note 156, at 14–15 (arguing that implied preemption is needed 
because Congress cannot identify all preexisting state laws that might conflict, let alone those 
enacted after the legislation is drafted). 
192 See id. at 15, 18. 
193 See Infra Part III.
194 Cf. Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 18023(d) 
(2012) (express provision stating that “[n]othing in [the ACA] shall be construed to relieve 
any health care provider from providing emergency services as required by State or Federal 
law, including . . . this title”). 
195 Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 947 (2016).
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on the question whether ERISA might prevent application of some ACA 
provisions.196
b. Implied Preemption 
Even those provisions not covered by the muddled general preemption 
provision could have preemptive effect when they make contact with state 
law.197
The individual mandate, for example, is not covered by the Title I general 
preemption provision and does not have its own preemption provision.198 Yet 
reviewing courts have held that the ACA preempts state efforts to exempt state 
citizens from the mandate and other obstructionist state laws passed in resistance 
to the ACA. In 2014, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the effect of an Arizona 
constitutional amendment allowing its citizens to forego minimum health 
insurance coverage and abstain from paying any penalties.199 The Ninth Circuit 
held that the Arizona law “presents a classic case of preemption by implication 
because [it] ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress,’”200 and is, therefore, preempted 
under the Supremacy Clause. While impossibility conflict would preempt the 
Arizona nonmandate, the Ninth Circuit applied the broader obstacle 
preemption,201 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.202 Other litigation 
challenging the wave of ACA-protesting state laws has ended with a similar 
implied preemption analysis invalidating the state law.203
The scope of Congress’s general preemptive intent—the “touchstone” of 
preemption analysis204—remains muddled with respect to the ACA’s seminal 
insurance reforms. For present purposes, the important point emerging from this 
muddle is that Congress intended its ACA insurance market reforms to have 
preemptive effect.
Overall, the ACA somewhat bucks the trend of piecemeal health legislation 
by making law incrementally in nearly every sphere of health care regulation 
                                                                                                                     
196 Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1191(a)(2) (2012) (providing that the new ACA provisions shall 
not be construed to affect or modify the ERISA preemption clause as applied to group health 
plans); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-23(a)(2) (2012) (same).
197 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 227–29; Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 
23, at 525.
198 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) (lacking a preemption provision).
199 Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing ARIZ. CONST. art. 
XXVII, § 2(A)(1)–(2)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1699 (2015) (mem.).
200 Id. (“A state law . . . is preempted if it interferes with the methods by which the 
federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal.” (alteration in original) (quoting Gade v. 
Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992))).
201 Id.
202 Coons v. Lew, 135 S. Ct. 1699, 1699 (2015) (mem.).
203 See, e.g., St. Louis Effort for AIDS v. Huff, 782 F.3d 1016, 1023 (8th Cir. 2015).
204 Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
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and expressly preempting contrary state laws. The statute’s muddled preemption 
statement does little to bring clarity to the muddy waters of health law 
preemption.
Yet the ACA creates a waiver program that allows a federal agency to 
suspend application of otherwise preemptive law and sanction a state’s 
deviation from the ACA.205 Through this waiver mechanism, discussed in Part 
III below, the ACA contains its own escape hatch. As long as a state credibly 
promises to pursue federal goals by enacting laws of comparable affordability, 
access, and comprehensiveness, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) can waive the biggest parts of the statute and enable the state to strike 
out on its own.206 This may be the ACA’s repeal from within, or its salvation.
III. PREEMPTION MEETS “BIG WAIVER” IN THE ACA
Nestled among other provisions for “State Flexibility to Establish 
Alternative Programs,”207 the ACA’s section 1332 establishes a waiver 
mechanism that can suspend the individual and employer mandates, operation 
of the insurance exchanges, essential health benefits, subsidies, and other 
coverage regulation in the individual market for states to pursue their own 
alternative programs.208
Specifically, the ACA’s “Waiver for State innovation” provides:
(1) In general 
A State may apply to the Secretary for the waiver of all or any requirements 
described in paragraph (2) with respect to health insurance coverage 
within that State for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2017. Such 
application shall—
(A) be filed at such time and in such manner as the Secretary may require;
(B) contain such information as the Secretary may require, including—
(i) a comprehensive description of the State legislation and program to 
implement a plan meeting the requirements for a waiver under this section; 
and
(ii) a 10-year budget plan for such plan that is budget neutral for the Federal 
Government; and
(C) provide an assurance that the State has enacted the law described in 
subsection (b)(2).
(2) Requirements 
                                                                                                                     
205 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012).
206 See John E. McDonough, The Demise of Vermont’s Single-Payer Plan, 372 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1584, 1585 (2015). 
207 42 U.S.C. §§ 18051–18054. The other “flexibility” alternatives include establishing 
state “basic health programs for low-income individuals not eligible for Medicaid,” id. 
§ 18051, and offering multi-state plans, id. §§ 18053–18054.
208 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012).
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The requirements described in this paragraph with respect to health insurance 
coverage within the State for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 
2014, are as follows:
(A) Part A of this subchapter [qualified health plan and essential benefits 
provisions].
(B) Part B of this subchapter [health insurance exchange, individual market 
risk pooling, and financial integrity provisions].
(C) Section 18071 of this title [cost-sharing provisions].
(D) Sections 36B, 4980H, and 5000A of title 26 [premium assistance tax 
credits, employer and individual mandates].209
While the ACA gives section 1332 the title, “Waiver for State 
Innovation,”210 this waiver provision goes by many names. Many commentators 
refer to it as the “section 1332 waiver.”211 CMS and others call it the “State 
Innovation Waiver.”212 Other scholars have proposed that “[a] better name for 
this program might be Waivers for State Responsibility, because they do not 
exempt states from accomplishing the aims of the ACA, but give them the ability 
(and responsibility) to fulfill them in a different manner, while staying between 
certain guardrails.”213 This moniker, or even “insurance market waiver,” would 
help distinguish 1332 from other “innovation” waivers and the preexisting 
“Medicaid waivers.”214
The 1332 waiver could be called the ACA’s “big waiver,” as well. By any 
name, section 1332’s waiver has been aptly classified by Barron and Rakoff as 
an exemplar of their “big waiver” theory because the provision delegates power 
to an agency to “substantially revise and not modestly tweak” the statute’s core 
requirements.215
                                                                                                                     
209 Id. § 18052(a)(1)–(2).
210 Id.
211 The Act section number differentiates it from another longstanding HHS waiver 
power—the Medicaid section 1115 waiver. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Svcs., About 
Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/
section-1115-demo/about-1115/index.html [https://perma.cc/N8XT-YN7W]; Kevin Lucia 
et al., Innovation Waivers and the ACA: As Federal Officials Flesh Out Key Requirements 
for Modifying the Health Law, States Tread Slowly, COMMONWEALTH FUND: TO THE POINT
(Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2016/feb/ innovation-
waivers-and-the-aca [https://perma.cc/F8T8-YXM5] (comparing the “so-called section 1115 
waiver” with the section 1332 waiver).
212 See, e.g., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Section 1332: State Innovation 
Waivers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/cciio/programs-
and-initiatives/state-innovation-waivers/section_1332_state_innovation_waivers-.html 
[https://perma.cc/D8DX-GAF7]. 
213 Howard & Benshoof, supra note 16, at 237.
214 Cf. Lucia et al., supra note 211, at exhibit 1 (summarizing 1332 waivers under the 
title “State Waivers of the ACA’s Private Health Insurance Rules”). 
215 Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 278.
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This Part first describes how the 1332 innovation waiver works, then 
situates it within the theoretical context of “big waiver,” and finally examines 
some recent proposals to revise the statute.
A. The ACA’s State Innovation Waiver
The ACA’s innovation waiver provision sets parameters for the who, what, 
when, and how of the innovation waiver, delegating additional technical detail, 
as well as application of the statutory standards, to the implementing agencies. 
1. Waiver Authority
The statute authorizes the Secretary of HHS to review and determine waiver 
applications.216 The Secretary has delegated this authority to CMS, in 
coordination with the Department of the Treasury (Treasury).217 CMS and 
Treasury together have promulgated regulations and guidance on the waiver 
process,218 though CMS has assumed the lead role in reviewing and processing 
the applications.219
Section 1332 authorizes waiver of the ACA’s core private insurance market 
reforms:220
(A) the qualified health plan and essential benefits provisions;221
(B) the health insurance exchange, individual market risk pooling, and 
financial integrity provisions;222
(C) the cost-sharing provisions;223 and
(D) the premium assistance tax credits,224 employer225 and individual 
mandates.226
                                                                                                                     
216 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(1) (2012) (noting that states “may apply to the Secretary”); 
id. § 18052(b) (noting that “[t]he Secretary may grant” a waiver).
217 Delegation of Authorities, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,903, 53,903–04 (Aug. 30, 2011).
218 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 33.100, .102, .108, .112, .116, .120, .124, .128 (2017); 45
C.F.R. § 155.1302 (2016) (detailing the application process regulations).
219 See 45 C.F.R. § 155.1302 (2016) (noting that waiver applications are to be filed with 
CMS and the agency will refer any relevant requests to Treasury).
220 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(2) (2012); see Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 281 (“[The 
Act] allows a state to propose a health care scheme alternative to that provided by the Act 
and to ask for a waiver of key provisions of the Act . . . .”).
221 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 18021–18024 (detailing qualified health plans and 
essential health benefits of the ACA). 
222 See generally id. §§ 18031–18033 (detailing the health insurance exchange, 
individual market risk pooling, and financial integrity provisions of the ACA). 
223 See generally id. § 18071 (detailing the cost-sharing provisions of the ACA). 
224 See generally 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012) (detailing the tax credit scheme).
225 See generally id. § 4980H (detailing the employer mandate).
226 See generally id. § 5000A (detailing the individual mandate).
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These four groups of provisions constitute pillars of the ACA’s reform of 
the commercial insurance markets serving individuals and employers227—
which accounts for more than half of Americans.228 Each of these pillars plays 
an integral role in the ACA’s reforms, and all four interact with each other on 
some level. 
The first waivable pillar, group (A), sets a uniform federal minimum for the 
coverage, marketing, and reporting standards in all policies sold on the 
exchanges by certifying health plans as “qualified” (QHPs) and dictating 
categories of “essential health benefits” (EHBs) that must be covered, some 
without co-pay.229 In addition to the bare-bones “preventive health services” all 
insurance must cover, the “essential health benefits” establish a higher federal 
minimum for coverage in plans sold on the exchanges.230 Any health plan may 
be offered on an exchange only if it meets this federal minimum, 
“notwithstanding any provision of law that may require benefits other than the” 
federal EHBs.231 But, under the ACA, a state may require benefits “in addition 
to” the EHBs for its QHPs, as long as the state will “defray the cost of any 
additional benefits” required.232
While the (A) provisions regulate plan coverage, communication, and 
enrollment, the (B) group of waivable provisions extends to operation of the 
health exchanges, health insurers’ financial practices, and the affordability of 
coverage.233 The (B) group regulations include those requiring that exchanges 
implement certification procedures, maintain consumer assistance hotlines, rate 
plans, provide Medicaid eligibility information, establish a Navigator program, 
and use standardized formats for presenting plan options.234 Among other 
transparency provisions in group (B),235 the exchanges must require QHPs to 
                                                                                                                     
227 The other pillars of the ACA concentrated on expanding the role of public programs 
through the Medicaid expansion and quality initiatives. Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, 
Polarization and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1782 (2015) (“Medicaid and health 
exchanges stand as alternative pillars of the ACA . . . .”).
228 See JESSICA C. BARNETT & MARINA S. VORNOVITSKY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 6 (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-257.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8R5-9MT2].
229 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (2012) (discussing the requirements of QHPs); id.
§ 18022 (discussing the requirements of EHBs).
230 See id. §§ 18022(a)(1), 18031(c)(1) (stating additional requirements referenced in 
§ 18052 and setting these qualification criteria “at a minimum” of what the Secretary of HHS 
must establish).
231 Id. § 18031(d)(3)(A) (2012) (emphasis added) (describing the “[r]ules relating to 
additional required benefits”). 
232 Id. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(i). Cost-sharing reductions for lower-income enrollees are also 
not available for costs incurred by state additional benefits. Id. § 18071(c)(4). 
233 See, e.g., id. § 18031 (“Affordable Choices of Health Benefit Plans”). 
234 Id. § 18031(d)(4).
235 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(e)(3) (2012) (“Transparency in coverage”).
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disclose information on claims, enrollment, and finances,236 as well as to 
“submit a justification for any premium increase prior to” implementing it, and 
account for any increase in the certification decision.237
The risk-pooling provisions in group (B) require exchange plans to treat all 
individual enrollees as a single risk-pool and all small-group plan enrollees in a 
single risk pool, which generally evens out premiums across individuals.238
Finally, in the (C) and (D) groups, the statute permits waiver of the income-
based subsidies available in the individual market through the exchanges, and 
the insurance mandates—which apply in all insurance markets.239 The (C) 
group of waivable provisions are the cost-sharing subsidies, requiring reduced 
co-pays and deductibles for exchange-based silver plan enrollees with 
household income falling in the subsidized range (100%–400% of the federal 
poverty level).240
The (D) group of provisions are the insurance mandates and the premium
subsidies.241 While the individual mandate most famously compels individuals 
to find coverage or pay a tax, the individual mandate also sets the de facto true 
federal minimum of insurance coverage, for it applies to any and all sources of 
health insurance coverage, obtained on or off the exchanges.242 Individuals may 
satisfy the mandate in one of three ways: public program insurance (like 
Medicaid or Medicare), individual market policies bought on the exchanges, or 
employer-sponsored policies.243 In effect, this means that the minimum 
insurance required varies with the source of that insurance. Public programs 
have their own definitions of the minimum benefits required, which tend to be 
fairly comprehensive (though Medicaid has significant state-by-state waivers of 
those requirements)244 and automatically satisfy the mandate.245 Exchange-
                                                                                                                     
236 Id. § 18031(e)(3)(A). 
237 Id. § 18031(e)(2).
238 Id. § 18032(c). Because the (B) group provisions also limit “qualified individuals” 
shopping on the exchanges to non-incarcerated U.S. citizens and lawful residents, id.
§ 18032(f), a waiver potentially could extend exchange qualification to individuals with 
other immigration statuses.
239 See generally id. §§ 18071, 18052 (discussing the ACA’s cost-sharing provisions as 
well as the insurance mandates and premium subsidies).
240 42 U.S.C. § 18071(b) (2012).
241 Id. § 18052(a)(2)(D).
242 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f) (2012).
243 See U.S. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Types of Health Insurance that Count 
as Coverage, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/fees/plans-that-count-as-
coverage/ [https://perma.cc/N7F6-2W7S].
244 See Watson, supra note 18, at 221–31 (surveying the various state-by-state waivers 
of the Medicaid requirements attempted).
245 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(1)(A) (defining “minimum essential coverage” to mean 
coverage under government-sponsored programs including Medicare, Medicaid, the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program, TRICARE, the Department of Veterans Affairs, or 
Peace Corps). 
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based policies for the individual and small-employer markets by definition must 
meet all of the commercial regulations, plus cover EHBs246 and also 
automatically satisfy the mandate.247
But large group plans (employer-sponsored, including self-funded plans),
which cover almost half of Americans, are subject only to the issuance and 
preventive health services minimums, not the QHP or EHB requirements.248
“Coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored plan” satisfies the individual 
mandate, despite the reality that those plans may provide much skimpier 
coverage than the plans sold on exchanges.249
Under the innovation waiver, CMS could waive application of the insurance 
mandates themselves in a particular state, which could alter the incentives for 
participation in the individual market for health insurance and the scope of 
employer-sponsored health benefits.250 Thus, 1332 permits waiver of the 
individual and small-group market exchange reforms, as well as the universal 
individual and employer mandates. This is a substantial portion of the ACA’s 
total reforms and would apply to a substantial portion of the population.251
Three major pieces of the ACA remain beyond 1332’s immediate reach: (1) 
some reforms to the issuance and coverage of commercial health plans (for 
example, guaranteed issue, no medical underwriting, dependent coverage to age 
twenty-six, preventive health services covered without co-pay, and mandatory 
medical loss ratio reporting);252 (2) reforms to public programs, notably the 
Medicaid expansion, which is subject to its own waiver processes (found in 
                                                                                                                     
246 See 42 U.S.C. § 18022.
247 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(1)(C) (defining “minimum essential coverage” to include 
“coverage under a health plan offered in the individual market”). 
248 See Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: ‘Minimum Value’ Plans Must Have 
Hospital and Physician Coverage, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Nov. 4, 2014), http://health
affairs.org/blog/2014/11/04/implementing-health-reform-minimum-value-plans-must-
have-hospital-and-physician-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/B9X2-84BF]. 
249 26 U.S.C. 5000A(f)(1)(B).
250 Accounting for the section 1115 and section 1915(b) waivers in the Medicaid 
program brings the total population subject to CMS-waivable insurance regulations up to 
75%. See Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, HENRY J. KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (2016), http://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?dataView=0&
currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22as
c%22%7D [https://perma.cc/EHT5-TTAZ] (detailing that, in 2016, 7% of Americans had Non-
Group coverage in the individual market, 19% had Medicaid, and 49% had employer-
sponsored insurance; totaling 75% of people covered by a source of insurance with 
provisions waivable by CMS). Medicare, as a fully federal program, does not have as 
significant waiver provisions. Arguably, § 1332’s waiver of the individual mandate could 
impact 100% of tax-filing citizens. 
251 See id.
252 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1001–1253, 124 
Stat. 119, 130–62 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (detailing 
the immediate improvements to and expansion of quality health care).
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sections 1115 and 1915(b) of the Social Security Act);253 and (3) quality 
coordination, public health, and workforce improvements.254 But recent
proposed legislation would extend the 1332 waiver power to cover (1) and 
radically alter the entire Medicaid program (2), as detailed below.255
The innovation waiver provision expressly denies CMS authority to waive 
other laws under this delegation.256 Most notably, the ACA expressly stated its 
intent not to alter ERISA,257 which neither CMS nor Treasury administer. Thus, 
while CMS may waive the employer mandate for a particular state, the waiver 
does not alter ERISA’s prohibition on state laws targeting employer-sponsored 
health benefits.258
2. Waiver Standards and Process
The innovation waiver provisions constrain the agency’s discretion by 
prescribing standards for granting a waiver, and procedures the agency must 
employ in processing applications and making its decisions. 
While the insurance coverage regulations, exchanges, and mandates became 
effective between 2011 and 2015, the ACA innovation waiver did not become 
available until the plan year beginning January 1, 2017—after the 2016 
presidential election.259 Before the election, several states already had expressed 
their intent to seek innovation waivers: Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Oregon, 
Indiana, and Ohio. Massachusetts and Rhode Island enacted legislation 
authorizing state agencies to pursue waiver applications.260 In 2016, Oregon 
authorized its agency to apply for a waiver, but requires legislative preapproval 
of any waiver application and that the agency submit to the legislature “its 
                                                                                                                     
253 Id. §§ 2001–2955, 124 Stat. at 271–352 (detailing the role of and expansion of 
Medicaid under the ACA). The background of preemption largely distinguishes the ACA 
innovation waiver from the Medicaid waiver system, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315, 1396n (2012), 
because states may choose initially whether the federal Medicaid law will apply. 
254 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 2001–5701, 9001–9023 (detailing 
quality coordination, public health, workforce improvements, and revenue restrictions under 
the ACA).
255 See infra Part II.C.
256 42 U.S.C. § 18052(c)(2) (“The Secretary may not waive under this section any 
Federal law or requirement that is not within the authority of the Secretary.”).
257 See 29 U.S.C. § 1191(a)(2) (2012) (providing that the new ACA provisions shall not 
be construed to affect or modify the ERISA preemption clause as applied to group health 
plans); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-23(a)(2) (detailing the same); see also Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 947 (2016) (finding ACA had no bearing on ERISA preemption 
analysis).
258 See Marea B. Tumber, Note, The ACA’s 2017 State Innovation Waiver: Is ERISA a 
Roadblock to Meaningful Healthcare Reform?, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 388, 409 (2015).
259 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(1) (stating that states may apply for the waiver starting 
with “plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2017”).
260 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 176Q, § 3(x) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 42-157-5 (2015).
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recommendations for submitting an application” by March 1, 2017.261 In 2011, 
Indiana enacted legislation instructing that its Secretary of Family and Social 
Services and its Department of Insurance “shall investigate; and . . . may apply” 
for the waiver.262 Ohio’s legislature has gone the furthest, precommitting its 
state agency to apply for a waiver and prescribing the goal and some of the 
contents of the waiver application—notably requiring that the application 
request waiver of the individual and employer mandates.263
In the final year of President Obama’s Administration, Alaska, California, 
Hawai’i, and Vermont filed waiver applications.264 CMS granted Hawai’i’s 
waiver request to supplant its state fund for the small-business exchange 
required by the statute.265 California withdrew its waiver application days 
before the inauguration.266 Vermont’s application for an alternative to the small-
business exchange was denied based on incomplete actuarial support.267
After the 2016 presidential election, the fate of the ACA and its innovation 
wavier program appeared uncertain. Yet a new Executive Order instructed the 
Secretary of HHS to rely on his waiver authority to the “maximum extent 
permitted” by the ACA.268 Former Secretary Price actively encouraged state 
governors to apply for waivers.269 Shortly after Secretary Price’s letter, 
                                                                                                                     
261 H.R. 4017, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(3) (Or. 2016).
262 IND. CODE § 4-1-12-4 (2011).
263 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.052 (West Supp. 2017).
264 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, supra note 212.
265 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Fact Sheet: Hawai’i Innovation Waiver,
CENTER MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/
Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/Hawaii-1332-Waiver-Fact-
Sheet-12-30-16-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GXA-RMTU]. 
266 Letter from Peter V. Lee, Exec. Dir., Covered Cal., to Kevin J. Counihan, Dir. & 
Marketplace Exec. Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Jan. 18, 2017)
[hereinafter Letter from Peter V. Lee], https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-
Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/1332-Application-Withdrawal-Request-01-
18.pdf [https://perma.cc/34W8-FUC2].
267 Letter from Sylvia M. Burwell, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Peter 
Shumlin, Governor, Vt. (June 9, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-
Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/Vermont-Notice-of-Preliminary-
Determination-of-Incompleteness-.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXF6-8DRA] (providing Notice 
of Preliminary Determination of Incompleteness to the Governor of Vermont). 
268 Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351, 8351 (Jan. 20, 2017) (emphasizing the 
“imperative” that agencies “prepare to afford the States more flexibility” and instructing 
HHS to “exercise all authority and discretion available . . . to waive, defer, grant exemptions 
from . . . any provision . . . that would impose a fiscal [or regulatory] burden on any State”
(emphasis added)). 
269 See Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to 
State Governors (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-
Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/March-13-2017-letter_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPT9-TL8A]. 
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Minnesota submitted a waiver application.270 Alaska’s application was accepted 
in January and granted in July, 2017.271 By statute, CMS must rule on a state’s 
waiver application within six months of receiving the application.272
From March through September 2017, Congress drafted several proposals 
to modify the ACA’s core structure, nearly all of which focused on using the 
1332 waiver provision to gut the ACA without officially repealing it,273 as 
discussed in part C, below. These legislative efforts failed, but the 2017 open 
enrollment period drew near amid chaos and uncertainty about whether the 
ACA’s exchange provisions would be funded and enforced.274 Several more 
states submitted waiver applications aimed at stabilizing their individual 
markets, most with relatively modest requests.275
The ACA imposes five criteria on CMS’s waiver authority that circumscribe 
the “maximum extent” of its waiver power. CMS may grant a waiver only after 
determining that a state’s proposed new law will provide coverage:
1. “as least as comprehensive as” the EHBs offered on the exchanges;276
2. “at least as affordable as” the ACA private insurance coverage and cost 
sharing protections;277 and
                                                                                                                     
270 See Letter from Mark Dayton, Governor, Minn., and Minn. Legislators, to Steven 
Mnuchin, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, and Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. (May 5, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-
Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/Minnesota-Section-1332-Waiver.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A7ZR-ENNJ] (application and cover letter thanking the Secretary for his 
letter to state governors and requesting “swift review” of Minnesota’s application for a 
waiver on its state reinsurance program). 
271 Letter from Sylvia M. Burwell, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Bill 
Walker, Governor, Alaska (Jan. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Letter to Walker],
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/
SMB-Letter-Gov-Walker-1332.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YXB-KMCB]; Letter from Bill Walker, 
Governor, Alaska, to Lina Rashid, Senior Policy Advisor, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Svcs. (July 31, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-
Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/Alaska-STCs-signed-by-Treasury.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WUY-QG74] (accepting final terms and conditions of waiver approval).
272 42 U.S.C. § 18052(d)(1) (2012).
273 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Much Activity, Uncertainty Remains, 36 HEALTH AFF.
1864, 1864 (2017).
274 See Rabah Kamal et al., How the Loss of Cost-Sharing Subsidy Payments Is Affecting 
2018 Premiums, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.kff.
org/health-reform/issue-brief/how-the-loss-of-cost-sharing-subsidy-payments-is-affecting-2018-
premiums/ [https://perma.cc/V5J2-EF9A].
275 Oregon, Oklahoma, and Iowa submitted applications. See Jost, supra note 273, at 
1865.
276 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(A) (2012) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)) (describing 
and requiring “Essential Health Benefits”).
277 Id. § 18052(b)(1)(B) (referring to ACA Title I provisions generally). 
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3. “to at least a comparable number of [state] residents” as the ACA private 
insurance regulations would,278
4. without increasing the federal deficit.279
Additionally, the state must:
5. promise that it has, or will enact the state law described in its plan.280
The statute sketches out content for the waiver applications, but delegates 
the detail to HHS. The statute requires at least “an assurance that the State has 
enacted the law described” in its application,281 and former Secretary Burwell 
emphasized the role of this precommitment in the consideration of Alaska’s 
application.282
The statute only partially defines the standards of proof to which CMS will 
subject state applications.283 For example, the ACA’s evidentiary standard for 
determining whether a waiver plan is “as comprehensive as” the exchange 
regulations’ EHBs must be “certified by [the] Office of the Actuary of the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services based on sufficient data from the 
State and from comparable States about their experience with programs created 
by this Act and the provisions of this Act that would be waived.”284 CMS 
regulations further require state applications to provide actuarial analyses and 
actuarial certifications, economic analyses, data and assumptions, targets, an 
implementation timeline, and other necessary information to support the state’s 
estimates that the proposed waiver will comply with these requirements.285
If CMS grants a waiver, the statute requires the agency to notify the state of 
its decision, as well as the “terms and effectiveness” of the waiver granted.286
But if CMS denies waiver, CMS must notify both the state and “the appropriate 
committees of Congress” of the decision to deny the wavier and “the reasons” 
for the denial.287 Barron and Rakoff postulate that “[t]his difference in statutory 
structure indicates Congress’s approval of waivers with broad effects; if 
Congress were concerned about the breadth of waivers under this provision, 
presumably the notification procedure would be reversed such that Congress 
                                                                                                                     
278 Id. § 18052(b)(1)(C) (referring to ACA Title I provisions generally). 
279 Id. § 18052(b)(1)(D).
280 Id. § 18052(b)(2)(A) (“Requirement to enact a law”); id. § 18052(a)(1)(C) (noting 
that the application must certify that the state has already or will enact the waiver plan law). 
A state’s repeal of the law terminates the waiver, if granted. Id. § 18052(b)(2)(B).
281 Id. § 18052(a)(1)(C). 
282 Letter to Walker, supra note 271.
283 See 45 C.F.R. § 155.1308 (2016). 
284 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(A).
285 See 31 C.F.R. § 33.108(f)(4)–(g) (2015); 45 CFR § 155.1308(f)(3)(iv) (detailing the 
application, review, and reporting process for waivers for state innovation final rule).
286 42 U.S.C. § 18052(d)(2)(A).
287 Id. § 18052(d)(2)(B).
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would be notified of waiver approvals but would not require notification of 
denials.”288
The statute further directs CMS to develop a “process for coordinating” the 
1332 waiver applications with the Medicaid waiver applications that will permit 
“a single application” for waiving both (and for all other federal laws relating to 
the provision of health care “items or services”).289
B. The Giant Among Big Waivers
Because it addresses core features of the ACA, the innovation waiver has 
enormous potential to undo the statute’s seminal provisions based on 
speculative evidence. It is, undeniably, a big delegation of waiver authority. The 
revisions proposed thus far would only expand the breadth of the 1332 waiver 
delegation, as discussed in section C below.
The concept of statutory waiver is neither new nor unique to health law, but 
statutory waivers that apply to the very core of the statute itself recently have 
risen to prominence and attracted unique theoretical treatment. Professors 
Barron and Rakoff launched “big waiver” theory in 2013 with their In Defense 
of Big Waiver.290 Big waivers, according to their classification, “confer broad 
policymaking discretion so that the agency may choose to displace a regulatory 
baseline that Congress itself has established.”291
While many statutes grant agencies the power to waive statutory 
requirements, Barron and Rakoff distinguish the common “little waiver” 
provisions from the more consequential “big waiver” provisions.292 Little 
waivers “delegate a limited power to handle the exceptional case,” that is a 
“power to merely ‘modify’ or ‘tinker’ with a statute through the lifting of limited 
aspects of a requirement . . . to handle an unusual application.”293 “Big waiver,” 
by contrast, subjects the “heart of the statutory framework—the express 
provisions of it that seem most central to its effective operation as a regulatory
mechanism”—to administrative waiver.294 As a tool of legislative delegation, 
big waiver “certainly differs from other techniques that Congress has tried” and 
big waiver’s “operation is also clearly more legally consequential than the mere 
exercise of enforcement discretion.”295
Barron and Rakoff suggest that the inclusion of big waivers in legislation 
over the past few decades comes from the convergence of several historical 
                                                                                                                     
288 Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 282 n.54. 
289 42 U.S.C. 18052(a)(5). 
290 See generally Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19 (discussing agency use of the wide 
discretion provided by “big waivers” to displace statutory requirements set by Congress).
291 Id. at 291.
292 Id. at 276–78.
293 Id. at 277.
294 Id.
295 Id. at 291.
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forces.296 First, the growth of Spending Clause legislation, which conditions 
regulation on the receipt of funding and therefore inherently invites 
negotiation.297 It is worth noting, however, that the ACA’s big waiver suspends 
preemptive federal law made pursuant to the Commerce and Taxation powers, 
not a Spending Clause program.298 Second, the expansion of federal statutes and 
the “waning appeal of command and control regulation” brought cooperative 
federalism to the fore.299 Third, the “growth of professional lobbying,” the rise 
of legislative gridlock, and a divided government sent legislators seeking 
creative solutions.300
In their defense of big waiver, Barron and Rakoff argue that big waivers 
may encourage legislators to overcome gridlock, imbue legislation with a 
pragmatic flexibility to adapt to changing or unforeseen circumstances, as well
as provide a statutory updating mechanism more responsive than the lugubrious 
process of passing new legislation.301 All of these supposed values likely will 
be tested on the ACA, while Congress considers a full statutory repeal and the 
implementing agencies consider how to appropriately fulfill Executive Order 
13765 in the meantime.
Barron and Rakoff used the ACA’s innovation wavier as one of the six 
examples of statutory waivers that exemplify “big waiver” principles.302 The 
innovation waiver, in targeting multiple essential pillars of the health reform law 
(individual and employer mandates, the exchanges, and some coverage 
regulations), waives the heart of the statutory framework and therefore 
exemplifies big waiver.303 While the ACA innovation waiver fully embraces all 
the principles of big waiver and applies to preemptive law, it is not the “biggest” 
possible waiver in the Barron-and-Rakoff formulation because it still requires 
state application to trigger it and confines agency discretion both in the 
prescribed process and its standards.304
Yet the multiple-pillar approach and waiver of expressly preemptive law 
situates the ACA innovation waiver among the biggest of the existing big 
waivers.305 The ability to suspend important swaths of preemptive law make the 
                                                                                                                     
296 Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 293, 299–309. 
297 Id. at 293.
298 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 565–66, 568–74
(2012) (holding that the individual mandate was properly enacted through the taxation 
power); cf. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 279, 284 (using education and welfare 
Spending Clause programs as exemplars of big waiver). 
299 Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 299–304.
300 Id. at 304–09.
301 Id. at 309–11.
302 Id. at 281; cf. id. at 283 (describing the ACA’s Independent Payment Advisory Board 
as also reflecting some big waiver principles). 
303 See id. at 281.
304 Id. at 278.
305 Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 281.
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innovation waiver a particularly big waiver.306 Within the waivers covered by 
“big waiver” theory, the ACA innovation waiver is a giant.307 Recently 
proposed revisions to 1332 would convert it into a mega waiver, approaching 
the “biggest” waiver designation by removing significant constraints on 
granting the waiver.308
The ACA made law incrementally in nearly every sphere of health care 
regulation. Primarily, the ACA created a tremendous amount of new federal 
health law, expressly preempting conflicting state law. Yet the ACA counters 
preemption’s rigidity with a waiver program that can suspend the application of 
preemptive law by preapproving state legislation. 
C. The Proposed Mega Waiver 
The innovation waiver’s flexibility may give the ACA durability in a time
of political upheaval. Or, the proposed mega waiver may swallow the statute’s 
regulatory protections entirely.
The 1332 waiver is the ACA’s escape hatch: as long as a state credibly 
promises to pursue federal goals by enacting laws of comparable affordability, 
access, and comprehensiveness, CMS can waive the biggest parts of the statute 
and enable the state to strike out on its own.309 The escape hatch was set to open 
shortly before a new Congress convened to address the full statutory repeal 
promised by a new executive.310 While this turn of course casts significant doubt 
on the ACA’s continued existence as such,311 the innovation waiver appears 
poised to play a major role in determining health care regulation in the near-
term while Congress debates statutory reforms.312
Before the 2016 presidential election, health policy advocates expressed 
concern that the ACA innovation waiver could circumvent—or even undo—the 
                                                                                                                     
306 Id. at 281–84; McDonough, supra note 206, at 1585.
307 Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 281. 
308 See id. at 278 (defining the “biggest” waiver); Jost & Rosenbaum, supra note 31
(explaining proposed waiver expansions in the BCRA). 
309 See McDonough, supra note 206, at 1585. 
310 See, e.g., REDHEAD & KINZER, supra note 38, at 1–2; Robert Pear et al., G.O.P. Plans 
Immediate Repeal of Health Law, Then a Delay, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/12/02/us/politics/obamacare-repeal.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WU8Q-
P9NK].
311 See, e.g., Alison Kodjak, Trump, GOP Lawmakers Back Off from Immediate 
Obamacare Repeal, NPR (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/
02/06/513718166/trump-congressional-gop-back-off-from-immediate-obamacare-repeal
[https://perma.cc/2TQ9-PUBM].
312 See Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351, 8351 (Jan. 20, 2017) (announcing 
the new administration’s intention to repeal the ACA and prioritize state flexibility moving 
forward).
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law’s seminal reforms by granting waivers based on speculative evidence.313
After the election, the concerns shifted. 
The new President signed Executive Order 13765 on January 20, 2017, 
signaling an executive “policy” of asking Congress to repeal the ACA at some 
time in the future, while directing the ACA’s implementing agencies to use their 
existing “authority and discretion” to promote efficiency and state flexibility.314
Without expressly mentioning the innovation waiver—or any other ACA 
provision—the Executive Order seems to emphasize resort to waivers to the 
“maximum extent permitted” by the statute.315
Meanwhile, Republican members of Congress have worked on introducing 
legislation to “repeal and replace” the ACA in fits and starts. The initial attempt 
to repeal the ACA’s core provisions and pass replacement legislation failed in 
dramatic fashion on March 24, 2017, leaving the ACA intact.316 It remains to 
be seen whether Congress will repeal the ACA wholesale, as has been 
threatened, and whether Congress will replace it with legislation containing 
similarly large waivers.317
The most recent proposal would significantly relax the section 1332 waiver 
standards and procedure, which would create even more leeway for states to 
pursue waivers with very few protections and little, if any, evidentiary 
support.318 The discussion draft of H. R. 1628, the Better Care Reconciliation 
Act of 2017 (BCRA),319 dramatically expands the section 1332 waiver 
mechanism. Under the BCRA proposal, the Secretary must grant any state’s 
                                                                                                                     
313 See McDonough, supra note 206, at 1585. 
314 See Exec. Order 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8351 (setting a goal to “Minimiz[e] the 
Economic Burden of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Pending Repeal”).
315 Id. (emphasizing the “imperative” that agencies “prepare to afford the States more 
flexibility” in sections 1 and 4, and instructing HHS to “exercise all authority and discretion 
available . . . to waive, defer, [or] grant exemptions from . . . any provision . . . that would 
impose a fiscal [or regulatory] burden on any State” in section 2) (emphasis added). 
316 Robert Pear et al., In Major Defeat for Trump, Push To Repeal Health Law Fails,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2mYwVod [https://perma.cc/YC9V-J8W9];
Jennifer Steinhauer, Republicans Land a Punch on Health Care, to Their Own Face, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2n0TKHP [https://perma.cc/GZS7-NP7P].
317 Compare Timothy Jost, Taking Stock of Health Reform: Where We’ve Been, Where 
We’re Going, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Dec. 6, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/12/06/
taking-stock-of-health-reform-where-weve-been-where-were-going/ [https://perma.cc/6GTR-
6WPK] (discussing plans for replacing and repealing the ACA), with Billy Wynne, Five 
Reasons the ACA Won’t Be Repealed, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Dec. 7, 2016), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/12/07/five-reasons-the-aca-wont-be-repealed/
[https://perma.cc/NK9F-ULXL] (explaining why the ACA will not be repealed). 
318 Jost & Rosenbaum, supra note 31 (“Perhaps the most important private insurance 
market provision of the Senate bill comes near the end: its amendments to the 1332 state 
innovation waiver program.”).
319 Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (as passed by House,
May 4, 2017), https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BetterCareJuly13.2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J35U-ECAB].
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application unless its plan would increase the federal deficit.320 To get this new 
waiver a state would need only to describe what it wants to do and how its plan 
might “provide for alternative means of . . . increasing access . . . , reducing 
average premiums, . . . and increasing enrollment.”321 The new waiver would 
last eight years instead of five, and only the state could shorten it.322 All told, 
the proposed changes simply suspend the core of the ACA at a state’s demand. 
The BCRA mega waiver does not even require a state to use the federal pass-
through funding for health care, or any other specified purpose.323
More importantly for this present project and health care regulation in the 
longer term, the innovation waiver’s model for addressing conflicts between 
state and federal laws offers some alternatives to conventional regulatory 
preemption modes that may have enduring value. 
IV. AGENCY IMPRIMATUR AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR HEALTH CARE 
PREEMPTION
Preemption operates as a lever, shifting the center of authority over an issue. 
That shift can occur along three axes: the regulatory axis (from state to federal 
regulators), the enforcement axis (from judicial enforcement of private remedies 
to executive agency enforcement of public law),324 and the interpretive axis 
(from judicial to legislative pronouncements of preemptive intent).325 This Part 
explores a new doctrinal axis based on the innovation waiver’s shift from 
preemption doctrine to agency imprimatur in managing health law federalism. 
By imposing preemptive federal health insurance law, coupled with the big-
waiver power to officially sanction state-law variations, I argue here that the 
ACA creates a preemption-diffusion mechanism favoring agency expertise on 
whether state variations serve federal purposes and objectives. This mechanism 
puts an agency imprimatur326 on state dalliance and represents a shift toward 
conflict avoidance in a field saturated with state and federal laws. Giving federal 
license to state variation also represents a shift from preemption to waiver as a 
preferred tool of federalism and from judicial arbiters of acceptable conflicts to 
agency ones. 
                                                                                                                     
320 Id. § 207(a)(2)(A)(i).
321 Id. § 207(a)(1)(A)(i)(I).
322 See id. § 207(a)(4).
323 See Bagley, supra note 36 (“If state officials blow the Obamacare money on cocaine 
and hookers, there’s apparently nothing the federal government can do about it.”). 
324 See Moncrieff, supra note 76, at 2363; see also Maher, supra note 132, at 701–02.
325 See Sharpe, supra note 7, at 167.
326 See Imprimatur, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/imprimatur [https://perma.cc/2U5C-QY5P] (last updated Nov. 22, 
2017) (“[Imprimatur is defined as] approval of a publication under circumstances of official 
censorship.”).
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This Part introduces the imprimatur model of health care regulation and its 
constraints, as well as some normative implications of the imprimatur model for 
statutory reforms to health insurance. It concludes by posing some metrics by 
which to judge the applications of imprimatur and the current mega-waiver 
proposals. 
A. Preempting Preemption: The Agency Imprimatur Model 
Because preemption displaces state law with supreme federal law, 
applications of preemption doctrine usually “present . . . shifts of authority from 
state to federal forums”327 that are both “obvious”328 and decisive. Cooperative 
federalism329 and concurrent regulation, by contrast, can have subtler and “more 
muddled shifts in the general direction of federal forums,”330 while preemption 
of state remedies shifts enforcement authority from the judiciary to an executive 
agency.331
As a transsubstantive interpretive canon employed case-by-case in dispute 
resolution, preemption doctrine is not particularly well suited to promoting 
stability or coherence in any one body of substantive law.332 The complex and 
uncertain development of health insurance preemption precedent painfully 
illustrates the shortcomings in addressing preemption through litigation.333
The ACA creates a substantial body of preemptive law,334 which already 
has spawned numerous preemption arguments in litigation.335 And yet its 
                                                                                                                     
327 Moncrieff, supra note 76, at 2363.
328 Id. at 2364.
329 See Cooperative Federalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 729 (10th ed. 2014)
(“Distribution of power between the federal government and the states whereby each 
recognizes the powers of the other while jointly engaging in certain governmental 
functions.”); Kurzweil, supra note 19, at 578. 
330 Moncrieff, supra note 76, at 2363.
331 Id. at 2325, 2330–31, 2362. 
332 See Merrill, supra note 5, at 772–73 (arguing that although the judiciary is preferable 
to agencies in resolving preemption judgments, there remain significant complications in 
how courts should decide preemption issues). 
333 See supra Part II.A (discussing the "scattered landscape" of health law preemption 
outside of the ACA); see also Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365 
(2002) (lamenting that ERISA preemption “occupies a substantial share of [the Supreme] 
Court’s time”); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 808 
n.1 (1997) (complaining that ERISA preemption “ha[s] been the focus of considerable 
attention from this Court”); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995) (describing ERISA’s preemption clauses as 
“unhelpful” to the interpretation of intent). 
334 See supra Part II.B.2 (highlighting the fact that the ACA "wrote an awful lot of law" 
in areas with significant amounts of state law already established).
335 See, e.g., St. Louis Effort for AIDS v. Huff, 782 F.3d 1016, 1024 (8th Cir. 2015); 
Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1699 (2015) 
(mem.); Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
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waiver provision permits HHS to preapprove state-law variations on those most 
important new pieces of federal law.336 This represents a shift from reliance on 
post hoc judicial application of preemption doctrine to an ex ante federal agency 
approval of potentially conflicting state law. The waiver gives federal agency 
imprimatur to state-law variants which might otherwise trigger preemption 
doctrine in litigation. 
1. The Agency Imprimatur Model
The imprimatur model asserts federal power over a regulatory topic, sets 
federal objectives and parameters for that topic, and then guides and sanctions 
state-law variants the agency identifies as properly serving the federal 
objectives. As deployed in the ACA innovation waiver, imprimatur pushes state 
law out of the regulatory space with preemption, then invites state law into that 
space if the agency determines state law will serve federal objectives.
a. Preemptive Federal Boundaries 
The ACA builds incrementally on topics with preexisting federal and state 
regulation, some more rigorous than others.337 The ACA filled some of the 
blank federal space left by ERISA preemption and annexed some of the 
occupied state space on insurance content regulation. 
Before the ACA, state law primarily regulated the content of commercial 
health insurance, but those regulations varied widely among the states.338 The 
ACA planted a federal flag in the commercial insurance market, creating a 
unitary federal regulatory infrastructure and making preemptive federal law on 
coverage, issuance, and underwriting.339 The ACA mandates that all individuals 
have health insurance coverage,340 that every state has a health insurance 
                                                                                                                     
S. Ct. 2433, 2433 (2016); Am. Council of Life Insurers v. D.C. Health Benefit Exch. Auth., 
73 F. Supp. 3d 65, 80 (D.D.C. 2014), vacated, 815 F.3d 17, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (vacated for 
lack of jurisdiction).
336 See supra Part III (analyzing the ACA's "big waiver" provision).
337 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the areas in which the ACA can be reformed and 
expanded upon).
338 See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, Value-Based Mandated Health Benefits, 80 U. COLO. L.
REV. 127, 164 (2009) (detailing variations among states in regulating infertility coverage). 
See generally Amy B. Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare in Health Insurance Content 
Regulation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 139, 153–212 (2012) [hereinafter Monahan, Content 
Regulation] (presenting case studies of state health insurance content regulation, revealing 
that state laws are enacted without an evidentiary basis and respond to intense interest-group 
pressure). 
339 See supra Part II.B.1 (examining the ACA's regulations regarding the issuance, 
coverage, and administration of the commercial insurance market).
340 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012).
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exchange (even if the federal government has to run it),341 and that the insurance
policies sold on the exchanges conform to a set of detailed federal 
requirements.342 All of this mandatory law expressly preempts conflicting state 
standards and, in some provisions, expressly preempts even parallel state 
regulation.343
The Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius344 and King v. Burwell345 validated the ACA’s federal claim on 
commercial health insurance regulation as constitutionally permissible (the 
individual mandate in Sebelius)346 and intended for national uniformity (the 
exchange subsidies in King).347 The ACA thus brought federal uniformity to 
content regulation, largely through the health insurance exchanges.348 For 
individual and small-group insurance, the ACA asserts a strong, preemptive 
interest in the regulatory space and fills it with uniform federal regulations that 
states may tailor at the margins to fit their populations.349
By contrast, the ACA did relatively little to alter the sparse content 
regulation of policies sold to large employers,350 a regulatory space already 
federalized through ERISA.351 The ACA’s employer mandate, however, at last 
filled the vast regulatory void created by ERISA preemption. ERISA preempts 
state efforts to enact an employer mandate because the mandate directly 
“relate[s] to” an employer-sponsored benefit.352 Until the ACA, that space 
remained mostly empty353 because ERISA and its amendments offered very 
                                                                                                                     
341 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012) (“Each State shall . . . establish an American Health 
Benefit Exchange . . . for the State . . . .”).
342 Id. §§ 18021–18022. 
343 Id. § 1320a-7h(d)(3)(A) (2012).
344 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 589 (2012).
345 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
346 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 567–69.
347 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496.
348 E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)–(b) (2012) (requiring qualifying employers to provide 
minimum coverage to its employees or pay a penalty); 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(F) (2012).
349 See Monahan, Content Regulation, supra note 338, at 153 tbl.1.
350 See id. at 152–53, 153 tbl.1.
351 See id. at 152 (“Such plans remain subject only to ERISA’s limited substantive 
requirements.”).
352 Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH U. L.Q. 619, 623–
24, 655 (1994).
353 Except in Hawai’i, which has a special statutory exemption from ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(b)(5)(A)–(B)(ii) (2012), and Massachusetts, where the state employer mandate went 
unchallenged by ERISA preemption, see Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Andrés Torres,
Universal Health Care in Massachusetts: Setting the Standard for National Reform, 35 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 409, 409–10 (2008). 
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little federal regulation to fill the preempted area.354 The employer mandate, 
which applies with preemptive force, exercises federal regulatory power long
dormant under ERISA.355
The ACA thus reinforced the preemptive boundary around employer-
sponsored health insurance and established a new preemptive border around 
individual and group market regulations, though the precise extent of those 
preemptive boundaries is somewhat unclear.356 The statute asserts federal 
power over that regulatory space and gives notice that it intends to clear away 
state-law obstacles to achieving federal goals and objectives. 
b. Supervising State Law Within Federal Regulatory Space 
The ACA’s innovation waiver provision then invites states back into the 
reclaimed federal regulatory space, but only under direct supervision of CMS. 
First, the waiver operates as an invitation, not an immunization. The ACA’s 
provisions, by statutory design, had been in effect with preemptive power for 
over six years before states became able to ask for the waiver.357 So, for 
example, state efforts to suspend the individual mandate were preempted in the 
period during which the state could not (and therefore did not) request a waiver 
and offer a replacement.358
Similarly, the ACA provisions on the insurance exchanges contain 
considerable flexibility for states to implement the statute in cooperation with 
HHS.359 But the existence of the exchange and the baseline substantive rules for 
the insurance offered on it are mandatory, federal, and preemptive of state 
conflicts for at least the first six years.360 States may choose whether to operate 
their own exchanges without a waiver, but they may not choose whether to have 
an exchange at all and must abide by federal law inside it.361
                                                                                                                     
354 Katherine T. Vukadin, Unfinished Business: The Affordable Care Act and the 
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356 See 42 U.S.C. § 18042(a) (2012); supra Part II.B.2 (emphasizing the preemption 
doctrine's reliance on congressional intent, which can be difficult for courts to determine).
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358 Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1699 (2015) 
(mem.).
359 See 42 U.S.C. § 18042.
360 See id. §§ 18031–18033 (exchanges established); id. § 18052(a)(1) (setting waiver at 
January 1, 2017 plan years).
361 See id. §§ 18021–18022 (defining a "qualified health plan" and related terms, and 
outlining the minimum health benefits, cost-sharing limitations, and coverage levels required 
of such plans); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
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Second, the waiver provision contemplates an advisory role for HHS in the 
state legislative process. Section 1332 requires a state to point out the existing 
or proposed legislation that would secure its replacement program, which makes 
enacting the state legislation a precondition on granting a waiver.362 Plus, the 
provision makes the waiver, if granted, conditional on the continued validity of 
the state law.363 CMS is, in essence, preapproving new state law or sanctioning 
existing state law as consistent with federal law. The state legislature is 
accountable to CMS if a waiver is granted, promising to enact and keep state 
law on the books.364
Third, the ACA sets substantive parameters and standards that states’ 
current or future legislation will satisfy. If the state plan falls short in theory or 
evidence, CMS has no authority to approve it.365 If the state plan passes in 
theory but fails to deliver in practice, CMS may revoke the waiver.366 Even if 
the state plan delivers results, the waiver automatically expires after five years 
and requires a state reapply for renewal.367
CMS thus supervises state law, pursuant to a heavy delegation of waiver 
authority and under the auspices of federal regulatory infrastructure and 
priorities.368 The agency’s imprimatur on state variations suspends the 
application of preemptive federal law in this innovation waiver. 
c. Defusing Preemptive Conflicts 
CMS’s supervision of the innovation waiver can defuse potential conflicts 
with state law by bestowing the agency’s imprimatur on those state-law 
variations the agency believes will serve federal priorities. This imprimatur 
model can directly defuse preemptive conflicts which would otherwise 
invalidate the state variation. 
Consider, for example, a state law that (1) exempted all employers in the 
state from the employer mandate, and (2) entitled all state citizens to coverage 
under a single-payer plan to be offered and administrated by the state to the 
exclusion of all other plans. This is a modified hypothetical from the real effort 
                                                                                                                     
362 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(1)(A)–(C).
363 Id. § 18052(e).
364 See, e.g., Letter to Walker, supra note 271 (emphasizing prerequisite that the state 
legislature enact the proposed law). 
365 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b); Letter to Walker, supra note 271.
366 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(2)(B); Letter to Walker, supra note 271.
367 42 U.S.C. § 18052(e); Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Alaska: State 
Innovation Waiver Under Section 1332 of the PPACA, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS. (July 11, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-
Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/TT4J-L9TN] (“State 
Innovation Waivers are approved for five-year periods and can be renewed.”).
368 See Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548, 1558–60 
(2016).
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that recently failed in Vermont.369 Part (1) would be impossibility preempted as 
conflicting with the individual mandate,370 while part (2) might not impossibly 
conflict with the ACA’s coverage and exchange regulations if that single-payer 
plan covered all the ACA bases and was offered to individuals on an 
exchange.371 The deviations necessary to make the state single-payer option 
feasible likely would contradict the ACA’s detailed requirements and therefore 
be impossibility preempted,372 even though the state law as a whole goes further 
toward the ACA’s stated purposes of coverage and affordability than the statute 
itself does. 
Imprimatur also can indirectly defuse obstacle conflicts, which may or may 
not preempt some state variations. Most state law that simply adds to the ACA 
commercial insurance reforms should survive impossibility preemption.373 But 
some of those additional laws might still run afoul of obstacle preemption, 
particularly with respect to uniform summary of coverage requirements.374
Obstacle preemption can invalidate parallel but unique state regulations if 
they would frustrate the ACA’s purposes and objectives.375 While CMS might 
not want to go after state regulations that add to ACA insurance market 
protections,376 individuals subjected to these concurrent regulations might 
challenge them in litigation as impermissible obstacles. Lower courts continue 
to apply obstacle preemption doctrine, but its continued application at the 
appellate and Supreme Court levels is no longer so assured.377 In addition to 
avoiding this murky area of preemption doctrine, CMS approval of state 
                                                                                                                     
369 See McDonough, supra note 206, at 1584 (describing the financial and political 
factors that sank Vermont’s single player plan); Jessica Marcy, Vermont Edges Toward 
Single Payer Health Care, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 2, 2011), https://khn.org/news/
Vermont-single-payer-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/F4D5-5C4L] (describing Vermont’s 
efforts to build a single-payer health care system).
370 See Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1699 
(2015).
371 See Avik Roy, Six Reasons Why Vermont’s Single-Payer Health Plan Was Doomed 
from the Start, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=
https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2014/12/21/6-reasons-why-vermonts-single-payer-
health-plan-was-doomed-from-the-start [https://perma.cc/9LHU-DNYF] (“The Vermont plan 
aimed to replace employer-sponsored and individually-purchased private insurance with a 
single, state-run insurer. But the state couldn’t preempt Medicare, or military health care, or 
large companies . . . .”).
372 See, e.g., id.
373 See Weinberg, supra note 190, at 1753 (stating additional requirements survive 
actual conflicts). 
374 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a) (2012) (preempting all state regulation of the same 
“type” as the federal disclosure and coverage explanation requirements).
375 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
376 See Moncrieff, supra note 76, at 2340–41, 2341 n.83.
377 See Sharkey, supra note 160, at 86–93. 
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variations through the waiver signals the agency’s view that the state law helps, 
not hinders, federal objectives.378
The waiver provision operates as an ex ante decision on preemptive effect 
by CMS.379 It can be pre-preemption, defusing some potential conflicts of state 
and federal law.
2. Imprimatur in Its Doctrinal Context
The idea that agencies play an important role in preemption is far from 
novel.380 Nor is the federalism debate in preemption doctrine.381 In the past 
decade, courts and scholars have vigorously engaged over agencies’ power to
preempt state law (“agency preemption”)382 and the deference courts owe to 
agencies’ statements about preemption.383 The agency imprimatur model brings 
a fresh perspective, using a different posture than agency preemption. Agency 
imprimatur offers a theoretical perspective on agency decisions to un-preempt, 
or to preempt the preemption inquiry itself by formally sanctioning state-law 
variations. 
Similarly, Barron and Rakoff’s conceptualization of big waiver has attracted 
significant critical attention and theoretical development on delegation and 
cooperative federalism, while neglecting preemption.384 Daniel Deacon recently 
                                                                                                                     
378 See St. Louis Effort for AIDS v. Huff, 782 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 2015); see also 
St. Louis Effort for AIDS v. Huff, 170 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1224, 1226 (W.D. Mo. 2016) 
(granting summary judgment on remand after holding state-law provision on navigators 
“impedes Federal Navigators’ and CACs’ ability to fulfill their [ACA] duty to inform 
consumers about health plans”). 
379 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052.
380 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 753 
(2004) [hereinafter Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption]; Mendelson, supra note 23, at 
695; Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 
2069–72 (2008); Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 23, at 524; Young, supra 
note 40, at 278–79. 
381 E.g., Schapiro, supra note 22, at 42; Epstein & Greve, supra note 22, at 315.
382 See Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise with Chevmore 
Codification, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 587, 595 (2014).
383 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009) (reviewing agency statement 
about the impact of preemption with Skidmore deference, but affording no deference to 
agency policy statement about preemptive effects); id. at 582–85 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(proposing rejection of obstacle preemption by agencies and courts); Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000) (giving “some weight” to agency views about the 
impact of state law on federal objectives); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 23, at 1088; Funk, 
supra note 23, at 1239–40; Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's 
Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 1933, 1937 (2008); Mendelson, supra note 23, at 698; Rubenstein, supra note 23, at 
1136–37; Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 23, at 525–26; Verchick & 
Mendelson, supra note 23, at 13–32.
384 See, e.g., Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 266–67; Deacon, supra note 368, at 
1552 & n.5; Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 1818 & n.158; Kurzweil, supra note 19, at 567 & 
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extrapolated big waiver to a broader context of “administrative forbearance”—
“[d]elegations to agencies of the power to deprive statutory provisions of legal 
force and effect.”385 Deacon’s examination highlights the policy implications 
and intra-agency applications of delegated forbearance authority within 
administrative law.386 He deeply engages with a normative comparison of 
administrative versus legislative decision making, highlighting the Voting 
Rights and Clean Air Acts,387 but intentionally leaves the “vertical-federalism 
implications of forbearance” for other work.388 Preemption doctrine squarely 
addresses these state-versus-federal law questions of vertical federalism.389
Combining big waiver and cooperative federalism, Martin Kurzweil has 
proposed an alternate governance framework of “disciplined devolution.”390 In 
the disciplined devolution governance framework, a big waiver permits states 
to deviate from a federal legislative scheme, requires federal approval and 
monitoring of state plans, encourages collaboration with local stakeholders, and 
compares the resulting experiences under state variations.391 The disciplined 
devolution framework, developed to describe Spending Clause education 
law,392 bears similarities to the ACA’s innovation waiver, but it is not concerned 
with the preemption dimensions.
The agency imprimatur model explored here views cooperative federalism 
through the lens of preemption. Agency imprimatur thus bridges the literatures 
of preemption and big waiver by illuminating big waiver’s role in answering 
preemption’s ultimate federalism question.393 Agency imprimatur emphasizes 
the foundation of preemptive federal statutory law, and it illustrates how waiver 
                                                                                                                     
n.1; Price, supra note 19, at 1137 & n.95; see also Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: 
Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1701 (2017).
385 See Deacon, supra note 368, at 1551.
386 See id. at 1551–52.
387 See id. at 1568–1602, 1608–14.
388 See id. at 1552 n.5.
389 See Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-Law 
Coordination, 111 MICH. L. REV. 647, 650 (2013) (“[V]irtually all preemption scholars seem 
focused on the proper allocation between state and federal power, a concern that we label 
‘vertical coordination[,]’ . . . [which is] clearly the central issue embedded in the Supremacy 
Clause . . . .”); see also Brannon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, 
and Legal Obstacles to State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 567, 
571 (2015) (assessing vertical federalism in the “preemption puzzle”).
390 See Kurzweil, supra note 19, at 568–69.
391 See id.
392 See id. at 569.
393 See Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 23, at 14 (describing preemption’s two 
biggest waivers as (1) when Congress should preempt a law, and (2) when a court should 
find preemption).
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of preemptive law realigns the preemption analysis and reassigns the 
management of some preemption questions from courts to agencies.394
Agencies with express delegations of rulemaking authority manage 
preemption by promulgating preemptive rules, or deciding not to.395 An 
agency’s choice whether to make a rule that will conflict with state law 
represents a choice of whether to permit state variations to persist.396 A big 
waiver of preemptive law, however, inverts that management function and 
expands it, as the ACA innovation waiver demonstrates.397 First, the statute and 
its duly promulgated regulations are preemptive to the extent of the delegation 
and the nature of the conflict with state law.398 Second, the state requests 
preapproval for its variations rather than the agency being the one to make new 
law.399 Third, the agency may suspend, rather than invoke, the preemptive force 
of law.400
With conflict preemption as the default position, this process for lending 
agency imprimatur to variant state law defuses conflicts that otherwise might 
trigger preemption disputes.401
B. Assessing Agency Imprimatur
The waiver of preemptive law represents a shift in the mechanism for 
calibrating health law’s federalism balance—a shift from judicial preemption 
doctrine to agency imprimatur.402 This shift in preemption policy toward agency 
discretion may portend both benefits and detriments for health reform, largely 
mirroring the institutional competencies of each branch and the tension between 
                                                                                                                     
394 See id. at 20 (discussing the “delegated program” structure wherein a state’s 
implementation of federal law must meet the federal program’s goals); see also sources cited 
supra note 23. 
395 See Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory 
Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (1984); Rubenstein, supra note 23, at 1148; Sharkey, 
Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 23, at 531.
396 See Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 23, at 525–26 (outlining the 
FDA’s attempt to preempt state law by including a statement of preemptive intent in a drug 
labeling rule’s preamble).
397 See supra Part III.
398 See Rubenstein, supra note 23, at 1137–38; supra Part II.B.2.
399 See Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 23, at 529–30.
400 See Foote, supra note 395, at 1445; Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 1818.
401 See Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 775–77 (describing such conflicts). The statute’s 
general delegation of power to promulgate standards and the agency’s considerable 
discretion in doing so empower HHS to import state standards to define federal terms. See 
Rubenstein, supra note 23, at 1149. 
402 Compare McCuskey, supra note 1, at 96–97 (highlighting the relevance of judicial 
preemption doctrine), with Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver after the Health 
Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE 227, 231–35 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013) 
(arguing that “federalism by waiver” trend should be accelerated).
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uniformity and experimentation.403 The imprimatur model’s normative value 
for health reform has only begun to be tested under the ACA’s innovation 
waiver. Some metrics for assessing its utility—either under the ACA or a 
potential replacement—are needed.
1. Delegation and Discretion
Even under a very big waiver, the sweep of agency imprimatur is not 
boundless. It may be constrained by express statutory delegation and limitations 
on inter-statutory waiver authority. The ACA has both limitations, each of 
which can promote or hinder the agency imprimatur model’s potential to 
untangle preemption issues.
Arguably the most important limitation on any executive agency’s power is 
the concept of delegation, which scrutinizes Congress’s statutory authorization 
of agency action.404 Congress may delegate lawmaking powers to executive 
agencies as long as Congress provides the agency with “intelligible principle[s]” 
to follow in that task.405 Agencies may not exercise power that exceeds 
Congress’s delegation.406 The waiver delegation in the ACA constrains CMS’s 
imprimatur power by limiting waivers to four enumerated pieces of the 
statute,407 and by prescribing five substantive prerequisites for any grant of 
waiver.408 CMS guidance on the waiver process hews to those flexible 
constraints.409
The procedural requirements in the ACA also cabin the agency’s use of 
imprimatur. The statute prescribes general rules for the application process on 
which CMS may elaborate, but from which it may not deviate.410 The 
imprimatur model does not empower the agency to waive preemptive law sua 
sponte.411 Imprimatur is an inherently reactionary power that depends initially 
on states’ willingness to apply for waivers.412
The waiver provision expressly denies CMS authority to waive other laws 
under this delegation.413 The agency’s ability to effectuate coherent policy 
                                                                                                                     
403 See Bagenstos, supra note 402, at 227.
404 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Essay, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of 
Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2015 (2011).
405 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
406 See Rubenstein, supra note 23, at 1126–27. 
407 See supra Part III.A.1; see also Clifton Williams, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio 
Alterius, 15 MARQ. L. REV. 191, 193 (1931) (“[T]he enumeration of the requirements in the 
statute excluded all others not enumerated . . . .”).
408 See supra Part III.A.2.
409 See 31 C.F.R. § 33.108 (2015) (application procedures).
410 See supra Part III.A.2.
411 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(1) (2012).
412 See id.
413 Id. § 18052(c)(2) (“The Secretary may not waive under this section any Federal law 
or requirement that is not within the authority of the Secretary.”).
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within health insurance law—and other varied health law topics—is limited 
when the imprimatur authority is confined to just the innovation waiver.414 For 
a comprehensive set of waivable health laws, the agency must look for other 
delegations that are sparse and which include only the ACA’s Medicare IPAB 
provision,415 the Medicaid waivers,416 and a very limited “national security” 
wavier for some investigational new drugs.417 The waiver imprimatur thus takes 
one step in the direction of agency-supervised health law federalism,418 but 
stops far short of any broader power to unite policy and avoid conflict. 
This confinement further diminishes CMS’s power to defuse ERISA 
preemption conflicts. The ACA innovation waiver provision explicitly allows 
waiver of the employer mandate for an equivalent state plan.419 Thus, if a state 
waiver application requests suspension of the employer mandate, then the state 
must satisfy CMS that its suspension will not create a gap in coverage.420 ERISA 
would preempt almost every state effort to replace the employer mandate with 
a law that “relates to” employer-sponsored insurance.421 CMS does not 
administer ERISA and the ACA expressly stated its intent not to alter ERISA,422
leaving states with few effective replacement options for the employer mandate. 
On the other hand, CMS’s separate waiver authority in Medicaid 
sections 1115 and 1915(b) provisions has serious potential to expand—rather 
than constrain—the agency’s reliance on the innovation waiver. CMS’s 
experience with the Medicaid waiver application onslaught after National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius423 could color its approach to 
the distinctive innovation waiver process.424 Although found in different 
                                                                                                                     
414 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 143–44 (arguing that nearly every topic in health law 
has federal dimensions).
415 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk.
416 See Office of Family Assistance, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Guidance 
Concerning Waiver and Expenditure Authority Under Section 1115, TANF-ACF-IM-2012-
03 (July 12, 2012), http://arts-attic.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/TANF-ACF-IM-
2012-03-Guidance-concerning-waiver-and-expenditure-authority-under-Section-1115-Office-
of-Family-Assistance-Administration-for-Children-and-Families.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6MCA-KPWM].
417 See 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f)(1) (2012) (giving the President power to waive the prior 
consent requirement for an “investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied 
use to a member of the armed forces in connection with the member's participation in a 
particular military operation”).
418 Cf. James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Nationalizing Health Care Reform in a Federalist 
System, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1245, 1247 (2010/2011) (stating that the success of health care 
reform could depend on federal-state cooperation). 
419 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1).
420 Id.
421 Tumber, supra note 258, at 413. 
422 Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 947 (2016).
423 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
424 See Bagenstos, supra note 402, at 233; Watson, supra note 18, at 220–21; Nicole 
Huberfeld, Medicaid at 50: From Exclusion to Expansion to Universality, HEALTH AFF.:
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statutes passed at different times, the ACA innovation provision allows 
combined applications and review.425 While the efficiency is laudable, the much 
more liberal standard in the Medicaid waiver should not be allowed to bleed 
over into consideration of the innovation waiver.426
The agency’s discretion in granting waivers, and the constraints in its 
delegated authority to do so, could be both detrimental and beneficial. If the 
delegated discretion is too broad, then an agency may grant waivers for state 
proposals that would significantly erode federal goals of uniform protections 
and access. But, if the delegation is too constrained and the criteria are too 
stringent, then many promising state efforts will be denied and remain 
preempted, stifling experimentation. By setting fairly rigorous equivalent 
protections as the criteria for granting the waiver, the ACA sets a bulwark 
against the most significant erosions of uniformity. But the ACA’s evidentiary 
standards for proving equivalence invite state experimentation based on
speculative proof, which could erode uniform protection during the experiment 
period. 
And, as with most matters of agency discretion, the expertise and outlook 
of agency leadership can vary widely between administrations. Regulatory 
capture of an agency poses a serious threat to realizing any of the benefits from 
delegation to agency expertise and discretion.427 This delicate balance of 
uniform protections and experimentation depends largely on the administrators’ 
values and appetites for evidence. 
2. Institutional Competence
The values of agency expertise and discretion in the agency imprimatur 
model must be measured against courts’ expertise and discretion in determining 
the same issue: which state variations on federal law may persist.428 Courts long 
have claimed primary responsibility for implementing the contours of legal 
doctrine—particularly preemption.429 The innovation waiver reallocates some 
preemption policy responsibilities from the judiciary to the executive branch.430
                                                                                                                     
BLOG (Nov. 14, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/11/14/medicaid-at-50-from-exclusion-
to-expansion-to-universality/ [https://perma.cc/W6YW-YY4M] (tracing the waves of waiver 
applications before and after Sebelius and arguing that “federal policy should not 
accommodate the rent-seeking behavior of the states”).
425 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(5). 
426 Cf. Huberfeld, supra note 424 (discussing negative effect of federalism on Medicaid).
427 See generally Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government 
Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089 (1991) (noting that 
regulatory capture poses a serious threat). 
428 Cf. Deacon, supra note 368, at 1552 (comparing the decision making of agencies and 
Congress in the forbearance model without addressing the “vertical-federalism” question). 
429 See Meltzer, supra note 156, at 39.
430 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1) (delegating to the agency the task of determining if state 
innovations comply with federal law).
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And the ACA’s express preemption statement reclaims some interpretive power 
for Congress, too.431
Institutional choice theory offers a useful tool for evaluating the wisdom of 
this “deciding who decides”432 aspect of the preemption wavier. Institutional 
choice theory poses that “[w]hat law is, can be, or ought to be is determined by 
the character of those processes that make, interpret, and enforce law.”433
Comparisons among courts, legislatures, and agencies focus on the institutions’ 
strengths and weaknesses relative to the legal question studied.434 Which, then, 
is best suited to address the preemptive effects of federal health law? And does 
the imprimatur model choose wisely?
In the ACA’s innovation waiver, Congress delegated the power to the 
agency to “substantially revise” the ACA’s requirements435 by “displac[ing] 
regulatory baseline[s] that Congress itself has established.”436 Congress is not 
particularly agile at creating new law or motivated to revise old law,437 and thus 
it is not the ideal institution to which updating should be entrusted.438 Big waiver 
provides a means of ensuring that new law has “a ready means of staying 
fresh,”439 and “a salutary means of managing the practical governance concerns 
that make traditional delegation unavoidable.”440 It allocates to the 
representative body (Congress) the task of the “first draft” with less paralyzing 
consideration of the law’s innumerable consequences.441 It also allocates to the 
more nimble executive body (the agency) the task of managing and accounting 
for those consequences.442
Drilling down on the substantive issue of which institution is best suited for 
the task of determining whether state or federal health law should apply requires
                                                                                                                     
431 See Sharpe, supra note 7, at 163; cf. Deacon, supra note 368, at 1553 (describing 
Congress’s ability to use negative delegations to set requirements via “broad strokes”).
432 See Merrill, supra note 5, at 727 (quoting NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT 
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3
(1994)).
433 NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
OF RIGHTS 3 (2001).
434 See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (comparative institutional 
analysis); KOMESAR, supra note 433, at 3 (law and economics of comparative institutional 
analysis); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (institutional theory). 
435 Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 278.
436 Id. at 291.
437 See Merrill, supra note 5, at 753–54.
438 See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 269. 
439 Id. at 271.
440 Id. at 270.
441 Id. 
442 Id.
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a comparison of institutional competence on three issues: preemption analysis, 
substantive health law issues, and federalism.443
a. Preemption 
Courts have expertise in the interpretive method and in preemption doctrine. 
And yet “[p]reemption cases are not known for their methodological 
consistency.”444 Obstacle preemption in particular “vests considerable 
decisional discretion in the judiciary,”445 which can be good or bad depending 
on one’s view of the judgment.446 The fraught history of health law 
preemptions447 suggests that dexterity with interpretive doctrine has not helped 
courts fashion substantively desirable preemption boundaries. The Supreme 
Court has expressed exasperation with its own doctrinal development, 
particularly on health insurance preemptions.448
b. Substantive Health Law 
Courts may be somewhat better than agencies at determining preemption, 
but agencies have an informed perspective on “the practical impact of state rules 
on the effectuation of federal statutory purposes,”449 which can elude courts’ 
anecdotal experiences. CMS, for example, has only some experience with 
preemption,450 but considerably more expertise in the health care system and 
health care markets. Health and safety legislation frequently delegates to 
agencies the decision of whether to preempt or exempt state laws.451 From an 
institutional competence perspective,452 this sort of delegation efficiently defers 
                                                                                                                     
443 See infra Parts IV.B.2.a–c.
444 Meltzer, supra note 156, at 56.
445 Id. at 39. 
446 See Scott L. Greer & Peter D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism, 35 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 203, 203–04 (2010); Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 23, at 32 
(“[Preemption] will inevitably pit your principles against a desired outcome.”).
447 See McCuskey, supra note 1, at 96–97; supra Part II.A.
448 E.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 947–48 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (doubting whether “ERISA pre-emption” jurisprudence “is consistent with [the 
Court’s] broader pre-emption jurisprudence”); id. at 953, 958 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(disagreeing with the Court’s application of the “opaque” preemption clause, which uses 
doctrine still lacking determinacy, and “dissent[ing] from the Court’s retrieval of preemption 
doctrine that belongs in the discard bin”).
449 Meltzer, supra note 156, at 44; see also Merrill, supra note 5, at 777 (asserting that 
agencies are best equipped to assess the impact of diverse state rules).
450 See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV.
999, 1066 (2015) (discussing the fact that agency rule drafters are generally familiar with the 
canons of interpretation and administrative law doctrines).
451 See Foote, supra note 395, at 1437. 
452 See infra Part IV.B.2.
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to the big-picture experts on the efficacy and desirability of a mix of state and 
federal laws.453
Agencies’ substantive expertise features prominently in administrative law 
and in the canons of judicial deference to agency actions.454 Exercise of 
expertise can support judicial deference.455 Scientific and technical expertise, 
such as what HHS possesses in health law, may even attract more judicial 
deference than is warranted or normatively desirable.456 For a granular analysis 
of whether state law will effectuate federal purposes, agencies seem to have the 
advantage.457 Agencies can draw not only on their own substantive and big-
picture expertise, but can also draw on other types of experts.458 Access to this
interdisciplinary expertise and the ability to engage in factual investigation also 
gives the agency a better ability to grasp the “impact of uniformity and diversity 
on a national commercial [health care] market than does either Congress or the 
courts.”459
As Thomas Merrill has argued, preemption analysis includes “an evaluation 
of the real-world impact of state regulation on maintaining a national 
commercial market,” which statutory text rarely illuminates.460 The 
“multifaceted, high-stakes discretionary policy judgment” inherent in 
preemption policy “requires considerable sophistication if it is to be exercised 
properly. It is a fair question whether any legal institution is up to the task.”461
Addressing the question of regulations’ practical impact on markets and 
industry further raises the specter of regulatory capture,462 an infirmity in 
agencies, but not as much in the federal judiciary.463
                                                                                                                     
453 See Foote, supra note 395, at 1461. 
454 See generally Barnett, supra note 382 (considering how agency expertise does and 
should inform judicial review); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 23 (discussing the importance 
of agency expertise in areas where the Justices lack technical or specialized knowledge). 
455 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
456 See Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference 
Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1809 (2012); Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the 
Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 733, 756 (2011). 
457 See Merrill, supra note 5, at 755. 
458 Id.
459 Id.
460 Id. at 744. 
461 Id.
462 See Edna Earle Vass Johnson, Agency “Capture”: The “Revolving Door” Between 
Regulated Industries and Their Regulating Agencies, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 95, 95 (1983).
463 Cf. Patrick Luff, Captured Legislatures and Public-Interested Courts, 2013 UTAH L.
REV. 519, 521 (2013) (discussing why private interests are unable to capture the judiciary in
the same way they are generally understood to be able to capture the legislature).
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c. Federalism 
On the ultimate federalism issues involved in preemption, courts and 
agencies bring different skills to bear. Courts have expertise in the underlying 
structures and theories of federalism.464 As Nina Mendelson has argued, 
agencies are not natural experts in federalism per se.465 But their capacity for 
gathering and analyzing information can bring valuable empirical perspective 
to any decision whether to displace state law, as Catherine Sharkey has 
illustrated.466
The innovation waiver subtly divides the labor on the ultimate federalism 
questions.467 The agency’s imprimatur on state variations that further federal 
objectives is insulated from judicial review, relying on the agency’s analysis of 
data and legislation provided by the state and other agencies. But the agency’s 
decision that a state variation does not sufficiently further federal objectives 
ultimately gets de novo judicial review, drawing on the courts’ expertise in this 
more sensitive federalism posture.468 This imbalance is also reflected in the 
statutory requirement that the agency explain only those decisions that deny a
waiver, not the decisions that grant one.469
Despite the potential gains from a policy perspective in delegating some of 
this labor to the agency, concerns about regulatory capture of that agency 
remain. While the innovation waiver itself constrains agency discretion to some 
extent, the imprimatur model relies on agency expertise and independence that 
are far from given. The imprimatur model’s success should, to some extent, be 
judged by the precision with which it delegates responsibility for managing 
preemption to the more competent institution on each metric. 
3. Reviewability and Review
The ACA shift to agency imprimatur engenders a potential shift in the 
review of state deviation. By administratively sanctioning state-law variants ex 
                                                                                                                     
464 See generally Mendelson, supra note 23 (discussing courts’ analysis of the 
federalism issue in a variety of cases).
465 Id. at 721–22.
466 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” 
Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2153 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalism 
Accountability]; Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 23, at 578–90 (arguing that 
agencies should rely on empirics when determining whether state laws contravene federal 
purposes). 
467 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012) (outlining waiver for state innovation with 
respect to health insurance coverage).
468 Cf. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986) (characterizing 
questions about federal jurisdiction over state cases as involving particularly “sensitive 
judgments”). 
469 42 U.S.C. § 18052(d)(2)(B). 
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ante, the imprimatur model may avoid some of the post hoc preemption analysis 
that arises through litigation and judicial review. 
In the ordinary working of things, preemption questions come up in 
litigation about the rights and duties of particular parties.470 In the course of 
adjudicating those rights and duties, the court must consider the reach of a 
federal law on the books and a state law on the books, determining whether they 
conflict and, if so, whether Congress intended the federal law to supersede the 
state.471 That is, usually courts are tasked with answering the ultimate question 
whether existing federal law and state laws on a particular issue may coexist.472
And courts approach the question in a litigation posture de novo, looking to 
Congressional intent as the touchstone of the analysis.473
The innovation waiver carves two alternative routes to pursuing 
preemption’s ultimate question.474 Rather than waiting for litigation to trigger a 
conflict ripe for judicial review, a state may apply to the agency for a similar 
determination.475 If the agency grants the request for a waiver, it sanctions the 
particular state variant and suspends federal law’s preemptive force, defusing 
the potential conflict.476 If the agency denies a request for a waiver, then that 
decision itself becomes reviewable.477 If the state enacts the law without a 
waiver, federal law retains its preemptive force and a court may review the 
preemption question in an appropriate litigation posture.478
Figure 1, below, roughly illustrates the paths the state–federal conflict may 
take.
                                                                                                                     
470 See Mendelson, supra note 23, at 721–22; Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra
note 23, at 578–90; Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption as a Judicial End-Run Around the 
Administrative Process?, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 1 (2012) [hereinafter Sharkey, 
Preemption as a Judicial End-Run] (“Private parties wield preemption—typically as a 
defense. . . . Courts are then called upon to decide the extent to which state law is inconsistent 
with federal law.”).
471 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 260.
472 Id.
473 Id. at 276; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
474 42 U.S.C. § 18052(d)(2). 
475 Id. § 18052(a)(1). 
476 See id. § 18052(b)(1).
477 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (judicial review of agency action). 
478 See id.
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Figure 1: Review and Preemption in the ACA Innovation Waiver
The left column represents the ordinary workings of preemption. Where 
federal law and state law overlap, the parties to litigation may raise preemption 
to press claims,479 defend against the enforcement of state law,480 or even to 
invoke federal jurisdiction.481 In this litigation posture, the preemption question 
proceeds directly to judicial review, under a de novo standard.482 Or, preemption 
issues may arise during agency rulemaking or adjudication.483 When challenged 
in litigation, courts review agency decisions about preemptive effect with 
diminished deference, a standard akin to de novo, but one which remains 
“murky” at best.484
                                                                                                                     
479 Cf. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 610 (2012) (declining 
to rule on whether private parties may maintain direct Supremacy Clause challenge to 
proposed state laws).
480 See Sharkey, Preemption as a Judicial End-Run, supra note 470, at 1.
481 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987) (holding that ERISA’s 
civil enforcement provisions and accompanying preemption provides a basis for removal 
jurisdiction); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012) (showing that ERISA complete 
preemption provision is jurisdictional). See generally Seinfeld, supra note 140 (discussing 
the fact that conferral of jurisdiction on the federal courts is designed to secure a hospitable 
forum for federal law claims and to yield uniformity in federal law interpretation). 
482 See, e.g., Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 32 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002); Santino v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(“The district court's ruling that ERISA preempts Santino's state law claims is a legal 
conclusion, which this Court reviews de novo.”).
483 Sharkey, Preemption as a Judicial End-Run, supra note 470, at 1. 
484 See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 613 n.3 (2011) (deferring to “agency's 
interpretation of its regulations,” but not “agency's ultimate conclusion about” preemption); 
see also Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 642–43 (2014) 
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The two paths on the right half of Figure 1 represent the development of 
preemption questions in a waiver regime. States may request a waiver from the 
federal agency. If the agency denies the waiver, it must explain why. If the state 
wishes to pursue the variation from its denied application, the state or a citizen 
could challenge the agency’s decision as an aggrieved party. A court would 
review the agency’s waiver-denial decision deferentially. If the state proceeds 
with its law without a waiver, that conflict may proceed to preemption analysis 
through litigation. In litigation, a court examines preemption de novo—or 
something like it. 
If instead the agency grants the waiver, it suspends the preemptive force of 
the federal law and eliminates the conflict. Though CMS is not compelled to 
explain a waiver grant, it is likely to include an explanation with the decision. 
Granting the waiver suspends the federal law. But a state could still challenge 
the agency’s grant if the decision does not accept all of the provisions the state 
proposed. Or a citizen could challenge the agency’s grant if the citizen alleged 
she would have been entitled to greater protections under the ACA than under 
the waiver. A court reviewing the agency decision to grant the waiver would 
apply Skidmore deference. But no preemption question remains for further 
litigation because the agency has suspended the force of the federal law.
The proliferation of paths can alter the reviewability and review of potential 
conflicts between federal and state laws. First, by defusing some state–federal 
conflicts before they start, the imprimatur model may avoid altogether the kind 
of dispute likely to trigger litigation or other judicial review.485 Second, 
imprimatur essentially diverts preemption decisions from the post hoc litigation 
context to the ex ante regulatory context.486 While courts treat preemption 
disputes in litigation essentially de novo, courts treat agency action with varying 
degrees of deference.487
Were states simply to make their own insurance market laws and wait for 
litigation to challenge any conflict with the ACA, a court would begin and end 
                                                                                                                     
(“After Wyeth, scholars have understood preemption, as a category, to be relevant to whether 
Chevron will apply . . . even if the doctrinal rule is still murky.”); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 227, 252 n.126 (2007); cf. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 380, at 
739–40 (discussing Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996), where the Court assumed 
without deciding that courts should resolve de novo the threshold question); Merrill, supra
note 5, at 775 (arguing for a review of agency preemption that is “sui generis”). 
485 Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (“[A] federal court [lacks] the power 
to render advisory opinions . . . .”); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).
486 Cf. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971) (“[Finding 
that agency] affidavits were merely ‘post hoc’ rationalizations, . . . which have traditionally 
been found to be an inadequate basis for review.” (citations omitted) (citing Secs. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943))).
487 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) 
(stating deference requires either express or implied delegation of power to an agency); 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).
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its analysis of that conflict with judicially crafted preemption doctrine.488 The 
determination of whether state law impossibly collides with the ACA or stands 
as an obstacle to its purposes and objectives would fall within the court’s 
discretion, guided by transsubstantive interpretive canons on congressional 
intent,489 as well as the ACA’s expressed preference for preemption of state 
laws that “[do] not prevent the application of” its insurance market 
provisions.490 A court would afford very little respect—if any at all—to the 
agency’s bald opinion on the preemptive force of its own regulations or 
decisions.491
If, however, a state first pursues a waiver for its variant law, then the path 
to litigation becomes more circuitous and the ultimate judicial review more 
deferential. Under the ACA innovation waiver, a state’s application for a waiver 
will prompt a ruling from CMS within six months.492 Meanwhile, CMS must 
provide a notice and comment period of at least thirty days for each waiver 
application.493 Once CMS finalizes its decision on the waiver and any 
administrative appeals are exhausted, the decision becomes subject to judicial 
review in a federal district court.494
A CMS denial of a waiver application seems to present the more direct route 
to judicial review because the state whose application was denied would 
constitute an “aggrieved” party with standing to challenge the decision in 
court.495 But a grant of the waiver application may still aggrieve parties enough 
to confer standing, even if less obviously.496 If, for example, a state’s waiver 
proposal would offer less generous or more expensive coverage than the ACA, 
then a citizen of that state whose insurance would shrink or whose costs would 
grow could challenge the waiver grant as an agency action that “adversely 
affected” her.497 Or, potentially, a state whose waiver application CMS grants 
only in part might be aggrieved about the denial of a waiver for the remainder.498
If an aggrieved party does seek judicial review, a federal court most likely 
will let the agency decision stand unless it was arbitrary and capricious, rather 
                                                                                                                     
488 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 231 (finding preemption derives from the Supremacy 
Clause, but is an interpretive tool). 
489 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 23, at 1202 (describing preemption as a 
discretionary, interpretive canon). 
490 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2012). 
491 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009) (disregarding FDA’s blanket opinion 
on the preemptive force of its labeling requirements). 
492 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)–(b).
493 Id. § 18052(a)(4)(B)(iii); 31 C.F.R. § 33.120(c)(1) (2015).
494 See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
495 See id. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to 
judicial review thereof.”).
496 Id.
497 Id.
498 Id.
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than reviewing it de novo.499 The informal adjudication powers and procedures 
prescribed by the ACA’s innovation waiver provisions invoke CMS’s 
substantive expertise on evaluating data and policy objectives, as well as 
authorize it to promulgate further regulations on the waiver process.500
Accordingly, a reviewing court likely will defer to CMS’s reasonable 
interpretations of the ACA’s innovation waiver and the accompanying 
regulations.501
The judicial deference owed to agency action insulates the agency’s 
imprimatur on state law from searching judicial review and amplifies the 
capacity to preempt preemption questions.502
4. Transparency, Participation, and Communicative Federalism
The imprimatur model further may facilitate dialog among stakeholders, 
federal, and state regulatory authorities, fostering a more direct and intentional 
division of regulatory power over health insurance coverage and access. The 
agency imprimatur model has the potential to imbue health law federalism 
decisions with more transparency and public participation opportunities than 
judicial preemption decisions afford.503 But these opportunities are not certain 
to materialize even under the waiver regime as currently formulated. 
The innovation waiver requires that CMS provide notice and a period for 
public comments upon receipt of a waiver application.504 CMS has stated that it 
will vary the comment period based on the complexity of the waiver application, 
but all will be at least thirty days.505 The administrative process for the waiver 
invites broader participation and perspectives on the preemption question than 
litigation does.506
                                                                                                                     
499 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413–14 (1971); Hyatt 
v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he circumstances under which de 
novo review of factual issues is appropriate are ‘narrow indeed.’” (citation omitted)).
500 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 33 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 155.1300–
.1328 (2016). 
501 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 23, at 1144. Additional deference may even be 
warranted because the ACA health insurance provisions are fairly technical and complex. 
See, e.g., Me. Med. Ctr. v. Burwell, 841 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[D]eference is most 
pronounced when the issue involves ‘a complex and highly technical regulatory program,’ 
such as Medicare . . . .” (quoting S. Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 308 F.3d 91, 97 (1st Cir. 
2002))).
502 Defusing these conflicts also prevents courts from developing preemption precedent 
about them. 
503 Cf. Watson, supra note 18, at 214 (discussing concerns about the lack of transparency 
in the waiver approval process).
504 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(4).
505 See 31 C.F.R. § 33.112; see also 45 C.F.R. § 155.1312.
506 See 31 C.F.R. § 33.112; 45 C.F.R. § 155.1312. 
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Standing requirements and joinder rules limit direct participation in 
litigation to those parties with a personal stake or vested interest in the 
outcome.507 Representative litigation broadens litigation participation by 
authorizing joinder of all those similarly situated to the litigants.508 Courts may 
permit amicus briefs from interested folks without formal standing, but there are 
procedural hurdles and qualifications, typically with little impact on the court’s 
analysis.509 Public comment in the administrative process, by contrast, is not 
limited to stakeholders or really anyone else.510 Plus, in the waiver process, the 
applicant is the state itself, a party that by its very existence should represent all 
its citizens.511
For sensitive questions about the federalism boundaries of health law—and 
especially for regulations affecting health care’s cost and accessibility—this 
broadened public participation could be useful to inform the agency’s ultimate 
decision, and to inform citizens about the proposals. 
Shifting these health law federalism decisions from courts to an agency 
imprimatur model may also infuse the determinations with greater transparency. 
The enormous discretion in courts’ application of preemption doctrine, as many 
commenters have lamented, makes preemption precedents opaque and 
unpredictable.512 Preemption doctrine has numerous different tests for how to 
identify preemptive conflicts and construe the respective state and federal 
laws.513 The waiver provision at least specifies the same substantive criteria for 
each agency decision on the existence of state law in the federal scheme.514 Still, 
the agency has plenty of discretion in assessing the congruence of the proposed 
state law and speculating on its likely effects.
Under the ACA, CMS need not offer reasoning for granting a waiver, but 
if CMS denies waiver, the agency must offer to both the state and “the 
appropriate committees of Congress” its “reasons” for the denial.515 Publicly 
                                                                                                                     
507 See Sharkey, Preemption as a Judicial End-Run, supra note 470, at 5 (“[D]irect APA 
challenges to preemptive rules promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration . . . are 
few and far between [because] standing and ripeness barriers . . . loom large . . . .”). See 
generally Daniel O. Bernstine, A “Standing” Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 501 (1979) (proposing that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure be amended to preclude a defendant from asserting any defense based on 
plaintiff’s lack of standing once the court has determined the merits of the claim).
508 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (class action); Miss. ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 
S. Ct. 736, 736 (2014) (parens patriae). 
509 See, e.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr. et al., The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. 
Supreme Court Opinion Content, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 917, 917 (2015).
510 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (APA rule making process).
511 See Margaret S. Thomas, Parens Patriae and the States’ Historic Police Power, 69 
SMU L. REV. 759, 795 (2016).
512 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 5, at 289; see also Sharpe, supra note 7, at 233.
513 See supra Part IV.A.1.
514 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012).
515 Id. § 18052(d)(2)(B).
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offering reasoned explanations can promote transparency and legitimacy, if 
properly executed.516 Yet the lopsided incentives in the innovation waiver draw 
out only half of this transparency.517 Based on the statutory criteria for granting 
a waiver, one must presume that a granted application satisfied all four
substantive criteria, but CMS need not explain why it does.518 Pragmatically, 
however, CMS likely would offer reasons for a grant, even if not compelled by 
statute to do so because the deference accorded will depend on the strength of 
the reasons stated.519
CMS’s discretion and lopsided incentives to offer reasoned explanations 
may prevent the agency imprimatur model from realizing transparency gains 
over court adjudication. But inverting the usual lines of communication may 
foster a more engaged federalism debate between federal and state agencies. As 
Catherine Sharkey has suggested, when federal agencies intend to displace state 
law, the federalism debate would be well served if the federal agency gathered 
empirical evidence to support the desirability of preemption, as well as 
consulted with state representatives, interest groups, and attorneys general.520
Although executive orders require agencies to think about and articulate the 
federalism implications of preemptive action,521 agencies typically do not have 
to go this far when doing so. The innovation waiver, by contrast, gives states a 
means for initiating the dialog and tasks states with gathering the evidence that 
their proposed laws will not impede federal objectives. 
C. Waivers Without Standards 
The agency imprimatur model, if properly calibrated, has the potential to 
improve on preemption in institutional competence and expertise, transparency, 
stakeholder participation, and the exchange of information between federal and 
state regulators. These gains depend on the strength of the statute’s preemptive 
baseline, the extent of the agency’s delegation and its reliance on substantive 
expertise, and the standards and processes required for the waiver of preemptive 
law. While it is too soon to observe whether the ACA’s 1332 waiver is well 
calibrated to achieve these gains,522 it seems instantly predictable that the 
proposed mega waiver expansions to 1332 are not. 
                                                                                                                     
516 See Mathilde Coen, Reasons for Reasons, in APPROACHES TO LEGAL RATIONALITY 
119, 119–21 (Dov M. Gabbay et al. eds., 2010); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged 
Precedent, 16 NEV. L.J. 515, 547–51 (2016).
517 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052. 
518 See id.
519 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
520 See Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 23, at 582–90.
521 See Exec. Order No. 13,132, at §§ 2–3, 3 C.F.R. § 206 (1999); Memorandum on 
Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 24, 693, 24,693 (2009).
522 The waiver program has only been available less than a year and five states have 
submitted applications. See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, supra note 212 (noting 
that Alaska, Hawai’i, California, Vermont, and Minnesota have submitted applications). 
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Waivers with minimal standards, or with minimal role for agency discretion 
and expertise do not fit well within the agency imprimatur model, as defined 
here, and are not likely to perform well on any of its proposed metrics. The 
recently proposed mega waiver revisions to 1332 offer an example.523 The 
BCRA’s proposed revisions affect the standards, procedure, scope, and duration 
of the original 1332 waiver. 
Perhaps most crucially, the BCRA would remove the agency’s discretion in 
reviewing waiver applications. Where the ACA said the Secretary “may” grant 
a waiver that met all three equivalence standards and did not add to the federal 
deficit, the BCRA would have changed the law so that the Secretary “shall” 
grant any waiver request “unless” it will increase the deficit.524 This converts 
the considered decision of the agency into a nearly automatic suspension of
federal law on demand.525 The BCRA’s only criteria for the agency’s 
substantive expertise is the question of financial impact,526 which hardly falls 
within HHS’s health law purview. The reviewing agency would have no
discretion to make a health policy or health law federalism determination about 
the desirability of the state variation.527 It could only check the state’s math.528
Further, the BCRA provision would have diluted the ACA’s equivalence 
standards for granting a waiver. The ACA allows the agency to waive 
preemptive law only if the agency is satisfied that the state variation will result 
in comprehensive coverage, affordability, and a number of insured equivalent 
to or surpassing the ACA.529 The BCRA would have removed those equivalence 
criteria from the standards for “granting of waivers.”530 Instead of criteria for 
granting a waiver, the BCRA required only that the application itself “contain 
information” on “how the State plan . . . would . . . take the place of” the federal 
law it asks to be waived, and “provide for alternative means of . . . increasing 
access to comprehensive coverage, reducing average premiums, providing 
consumers the freedom to purchase the health insurance of their choice, and 
                                                                                                                     
Two of the five have been withdrawn. See Peter Hirschfeld, Shumlin: It’s ‘Not the Right 
Time’ for Single Payer, VPR NEWS (Dec. 17, 2014), http://digital.vpr.net/post/
shumlin-its-not-right-time-single-payer#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/5TRC-USRH] (reporting that 
Vermont would abandon its effort to pursue a single payer system using waivers); Letter 
from Peter V. Lee, supra note 266 (withdrawing California’s waiver application). 
523 Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong., § 207 (as reported 
by House, May 4, 2017), https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BetterCareJuly13.
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/J35U-ECAB].
524 Id. § 207(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)–(II).
525 See id.
526 Id.
527 See id.
528 Id.
529 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2012).
530 H.R. 1628, § 207. Indeed, the BCRA removes all standards from the “Granting of 
waivers” criteria, other than neutral impact on the federal deficit. See id.
§ 207(a)(1)(A)(i)(II).
1166 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:5
increasing enrollment.”531 Ostensibly the agency could reject as incomplete or 
insufficient an application that failed to provide this information. But as long as 
the state includes the information, the revision appears to suggest the agency 
must grant it as long as the deficit numbers seem right.532
The drafters of these provisions probably did not have agency imprimatur 
in mind. The BCRA’s intent was to “repeal” the ACA, or at least alter large 
segments of it, but to target only those provisions that have a budget effect 
subject to reconciliation. These mega-waiver provisions constrain the agency’s 
ability to deny a waiver, while employing very little substantive expertise in the 
decision to grant a waiver. The goal is to waive the ACA’s regulations, writ 
large, without having to fully address a repeal.533 Certainly, the mega waiver 
would avoid large swaths of preemption because it allows states to suspend 
federal law with relatively little effort and very little consideration of how the 
state variation would fit within the preemptive federal scheme. 
While the BCRA revisions maintained the transparency provisions of 1332, 
they retained few of the opportunities for communication between HHS and 
state regulators. First, the new application standards would require much less 
information from states. Second, the decision process on the applications is 
focused on deficit impact, denying the incentive for a back-and-forth on whether 
and how each aspect of the plan might work on the health insurance markets. 
Finally, the BCRA waivers, once granted, would have lasted for eight years, 
imposed no reporting requirements to keep the pass-through funding, and been
revocable only by the state’s own initiative. There would be no apparent 
mechanism for HHS to supervise the implementation of the state waiver plan or 
to monitor how its variation fares.
Rather than the agency giving its considered seal of approval to useful-but-
possibly-preempted state variations, the BCRA waiver would have given the 
agency a rubber “grant” stamp, while taking away its “deny” stamp. The dilution 
of standards and discretion eviscerates the preemptive force of the statute’s 
baseline regulations, and also dilutes any advantages in institutional competence 
and communicative federalism. 
The precision and execution of the imprimatur model depend on the 
existence and strength of a federal statutory baseline and the expertise and 
independence of the agency assessing proposed variations. Both of these 
prerequisites to success currently are precarious as Congress considers a vast 
                                                                                                                     
531 Id. § 207(a)(1)(A)(i)(I).
532 The BCRA adds to the Secretary’s reporting requirements that he must report to 
Congress on the reasons for denying a waiver “and provide the data on which such 
determination was made.” Id. § 207(a)(3). This further suggests that the decision to deny a
waiver—rather than merely reject an application—must be based on financial data. 
533 The BCRA further allows a state to get a waiver even if it does not have a law in 
force to guarantee the protections, and allows a state to apply for a waiver based not on a 
promise to enact a law, but merely a “certification” from the state’s governor and insurance 
commissioner that they have the authority to implement the plan. Id. § 207(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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recalibration of federal health law and opponents of the ACA lead its 
implementation. 
V. CONCLUSION
The Affordable Care Act’s fate remains uncertain, though the federal 
impulse to reform the health insurance system remains strong and popular.534
The ACA’s innovation waiver may render the landmark statute flexible enough 
to survive upheaval, or the innovation waiver in a new form may enable the 
ACA to rise from its own ashes. Among the ACA’s numerous experiments in 
health law federalism, the innovation waiver offers some enduring value as an 
agency imprimatur model for wrangling thorny preemption issues in health law. 
Agency imprimatur as an alternative to preemption adjudication in health 
law has a lot to recommend it. The agency can draw on its considerable 
substantive expertise and experience to make more accurate judgments about 
the impact of state experimentation on a national system. The agency likewise 
can manage state variations in furtherance of a coherent set of federal goals. And 
the agency imprimatur process can account for more viewpoints and public 
participation than the old litigation model of preemption can. 
Yet the agency’s discretion in determining state applications, coupled with 
the deferential review it will receive by any court, raise serious concerns about 
the wisdom of suspending supremacy in this manner. Agency imprimatur—just 
like its sibling preemption doctrine—still belies a level of subjectivity that may 
undermine its potential to bring coherence and harmony to health law’s 
federalism. Agency imprimatur, as well as the ACA or its successor, should be 
judged on their ability to maximize institutional competencies and promote a 
communicative health law federalism.
                                                                                                                     
534 See Poll: Public Divided on Repealing Obamacare, but Few Want It Repealed 
Without Replacement Details, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 6, 2017), http://kff.org/
health-costs/press-release/poll-public-divided-on-repealing-obamacare-but-few-want-it-repealed-
without-replacement-details/ [https://perma.cc/3ACY-JH6J].

